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ABSTRACT 
The deterministic method has been the primary means of performing power system 
security assessment for a long time. This is partly because it is easy to understand 
and implement, and partly because it is usually quite conservative. In the past where 
monopoly was prevalent, the conservativeness resulted in a high degree of reliability in 
most power systems, while the investment and operational costs rose without the pres­
sure of competition. However, now because of the deregulation and practical difficuties 
to obtain authorizations from regulatory bodies to build power plants and transmission 
lines, people are more and more willing to operate power systems with lower security 
margins. This demands more accurate and comprehensive risk assessment tools. On the 
other hand, because of the fast development of the computer and of computational math­
ematics, probabilistic risk assessment becomes more and more practical. This kind of 
risk assessment can deal with both operational and planning problems. Although plan­
ning and operations are normally regarded as different catagories, this paper is aimed at 
building a framework for power system risk assessment in the planning stage such that it 
is developed naturally from the operational stage. The framework is modular so that it 
is relatively easy to implement, and each module can be improved individually without 
influencing other parts of the framework. Compared with Monte Carlo simulation where 
possible system trajectories are sampled, our framework employs the expected trajec­
tory, while accounting for the load uncertainty. One of the most prominent advantages 
of our proposed technique is that it can provide us decomposible and assignable risk 
among system components. The IEEE RTS' 96 is used as the test power system for our 
xiv 
proposed framework. Various calculation results are listed and analyzed. Some facility 
planning decisions are suggested based on our calculations. Our proposed framework is 
shown to be valid and efficient by these calculations. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 The Importance of Risk Assessment 
"No matter how good the deregulation is claimed to be, there must be something 
wrong if light bulbs stop shining." This concern was expressed by a power engineer 
when we discussed about deregulation. Unfortunately, this concern was strengthened by 
the severe power outage on December 7, 1998 in San Francisco, just 8 months after the 
formal beginning of the power system restructuring there. Is there anyting wrong with 
"deregulation", perhaps better known as "restructuring" ? 
In its simplest form, restructuring is the move to introduce competition among elec­
trical energy suppliers. It has been developed for more than two decades [1], and is 
still developing now [2] [3]. Deregulation has been tried in other industries such as the 
airlines, gas, and telecommunication industries and achieved significant success. Fur­
thermore, power system restructuring was also introduced into many other countries 
including United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, New Zealand, Australia, Spain, etc. Even 
Japan [4] and Korea [5] enacted appropriate acts to facilitate competition. In the United 
States, PJM and California have already built their own market. It seems deregulation 
is sweeping the whole world. 
An important issue within deregulation is reliability and whether it will decrease. 
Competition will inevitably lead to larger uncertainties in load and generation and in­
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evitably drive competitors to operate their components or systems closer to their security 
limits. Without accurate risk assessment and appropriate control, system reliability can 
not be guaranteed. Therefore, the world wide deregulation trend asks for more compre­
hensive and accurate risk assessment tools. 
As is mentioned by reference [6], today's risk assessment is like charting the unex­
plored oceans and imaginary lands for the medieval European people. The safe area 
identified by traditional deterministic criteria no longer satisfies a system operator who 
is either a competitor or an Independent System Operator (ISO) under the pressure 
of competition. What if we go outside the so-called safe area? Unlike the medieval 
analogy, we may suffer a great loss if we happen to choose a wrong direction. However, 
in our case, we are capable of obtaining abundant knowledge about the power system 
using computers, in contrast to the medieval's ignorance to the outside world and rel­
atively crude measurers. Unlike the brave Renaissance explorers, we can perform risk 
assessment without having to actually risk our dangers. 
1.1.2 Project Background 
From the beginning, power systems are inherently uncertain. To name a few uncer­
tainties, we have 
• Load. 
• Generation. 
• Topology of the network. 
• Measurement errors. 
• Component failures. 
• Weather conditions. 
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• Reservior constraints if there are some hydro plants. 
• Mistakes of operators. 
Now deregulation brings us market uncertainties. Despite these uncertainties, we 
have to maintain the system rehability, otherwise the benefit of deregulation will be lost. 
In recognizing the importance and urgency of constructing the risk assessment framework 
under the new deregulated environment, the Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
funded a project (contract W08604-01) to deal with framework construction of power 
system risk assessment. The project is also funded by National Science Foundation 
Grand ELS9502790. This dissertation reports on a part of the work in this project. Our 
task is to build a framework to evaluate risk under all these uncertainties, so that the 
evaluated risk can be compared with benefit to facilitate decision-making. 
1.1.3 The Concept of Risk 
The term "risk" is not a new concept in engineering circles; there is a large body of 
literature on risk analysis that has been generated by the process control industry, the 
airline industries, NASA, and the nuclear power industry. In addition, the insurance, 
financial, and casino industries all use risk analysis tools to deal with various problems. 
A representative sample of references include [7], [8], [9]. The main idea of the risk 
analysis in these areas is to research on the stochastic behaviours of loss. 
In power systems, risk means different things to different people. Some people refer 
risk to the probability, some people refer it to the impact, while others refer it to the 
expected impact. We think that the IEEE Standard Dictionary provides a clear defini­
tion that conforms quite well to the main precepts on which power system and security 
assessment is based. In this dictionary [10], risk associated with an event is defined 
as "the simple product of probability and consequence" of the event. Risk can also be 
thought of as the expected value of the consequence. In this dissertation, risk is defined 
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as the expected cost of operating under stressed conditions suffered by power system 
facilities under a reasonably likely scenario. According to this definition, we do not CEII-
culate financial or insurance risk suffered in the deregulated power market, although our 
calculation results can provide the basis for computing these risks. In addition, we do 
not calculate risk due to very low probability events such as independent, simultaneous 
outage of multiple components. 
1.1.4 Reliability vs. Risk Assessment 
Traditionally, electric utilities were more concerned about reliability than economy. 
With the developement of restructuring, it is gradually accepted that economy should 
be as important as reliability, if utilities are to be competitive. With the development of 
risk assessment tools, it is now possible to assess economy and reliability in a common 
framework. Therefore, the risk assessment, which combines reliability and economic 
analysis, becomes more and more attractive [11]. Under the new deregulated environ­
ment, we think risk assessment is more useful than reliability evaluation because of the 
following reasons. 
• Risk emphasizes the economic cost/benefit comparison. 
• Plisk assessment provides a simple index that is relatively easy to understand and 
calculate compared with reliabilty evaluation where a large number of indices have 
been proposed and used. Only expected cost need to be calculated, frequency 
indices and many other indices are not required. 
• Risk is decomposable and therefore can be related to individueil market players, 
while reliability is more system oriented and thus less decomposable. 
• Risk assessment can take factors from other markets (e.g., oil, gas, coal markets, 
etc.) into account. Because risk is measured in dollars, it is famili£ir to non-
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engineers employed in electricity markets. However, traditional reliability indices 
such as LOLP (loss of load probability) are not, as meaningful to people without 
the appropriate expertise on reliability indices. 
1.1.5 Hierarchical Level of Risk 
It has been suggested that reliability evaluation can be divided into three hierarchical 
levels [12]. 
• Hierarchical level 1: only includes generation facilities. 
• Hierarchical level 2: includes generation and transmission facilities. 
• Hierarchical level 3: includes generation, transmission and distribution. 
The problem we are addressing in this dissertation belongs to hierarchical level 2. 
However, we discuss risk here instead of reliability. 
1.1.6 Operation vs. Planning 
During the early days of electric power systems, the functions of planning and oper­
ating a power system were often considered quite distinct [13]. The problems planners 
and operators had to address were different, and so were tools employed to solve the 
problems. Such a division was formed due to computational diflBculties rather than 
physical essence. Physically, the planning analysis should be an accumulation of the 
operational analyses. 
This problem has been recognized by CIGRE amongst others for some considerable 
time, and indicated by the CIGRE "Power System Reliability Analysis Application 
Guide" [14]. However, the scope of those original considerations were limited only to 
the area of adequacy of single systems. Since then, the GIGRE Working-Group 38.03 
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are making effort to extend this previously limited scope to interconnected systems from 
an adequacy viewpoint, and to security aspects of single systems. 
One objective of this dissertation is aimed at developing planning risk assessment 
which is naturally extended from operational risk assessment, so that risk can be esti­
mated at every hour. Due to the developement of computers and compuation techniques, 
it is time now to "close the gap between the thought processes of system planners and 
of operators" [13]. 
1.1.7 Adequacy vs. Security 
Power system reliability assessment has long been divided into two distinct aspects: 
adequacy and security. Adequacy has been widely researched due to its simplicity [12]. 
However, security is not well addressed due to the complexity. The basis for security-
related considerations was laid out by T. Dy Liacco in [15][16][17]. Generally accepted 
definitions of adequacy and security are given by the North American Reliability Coun­
cil (NERC) Planning Standards [18]. According to the NERC standards, adequacy is 
defined as "the ability of the electric systems to supply the aggregate electrical demand 
and energy requirements of their customers at all times, taking into account scheduled 
and reasonably expected unscheduled outage of system elements". Security is defined 
as "the ability of the electric systems to withstand sudden disturbances such as electric 
short circuits or unanticipated loss of system elements". 
In the past, some persons have interpreted security as the ability of electric sys­
tems to withstand sudden disturbances in terms of the short term, so-called transient 
effects, whereas adequacy has been interpreted as the ability of the system to supply 
the load without violation of circuit or bus voltage constraints. Under this "traditional" 
interpretation, a secure system was one that would maintain uninterrupted supply to 
all loads, and all bus voltages and flows would be within defined ratings for all contin­
gencies in the credible contingency set. This division conveniently corresponded to the 
7 
way in which the two were studied: security was studied using dynamic analysis (time 
domain simulation) and adequacy was studied using steady-state analysis (power flow 
simulation). The division is also somewhat mathematical rather than physical. Due 
to the complexity of security assessment, traditional reliability evaluators are happy to 
calculate only adequacy indices, and leave security problems unanswered or partially 
addressed by crude and conservative deterministic approaches. However, the physical 
boundary of the two are somewhat smeared. If the system can not be kept stable, how 
can it provide load? 
This dissertation addresses both adequacy and security without making a clear divi­
sion between them. Instead, the total risk is functionally divided, as shown in the next 
subsection. 
1.1.8 Composition of Risk 
The risk of a power system can be functionally divided into 3 types: circuit overload, 
power flow infeasibility problems, and dynamic problems. We are motivated to include 
these three types of problems under the same umbrella because our intent is to develop 
a single assessment framework to encompass all of them. This conceptualization of risk 
is illustrated in Figure 1.1. Figure 1.1 also illustrates a decomposition of each of the 
three forms of security. The reason for making this further decomposition is because 
each of the six types of security at the lowest level of the hierarchy differ in terms of the 
specific calculation procedures we have developed to assess them. 
1.1.9 Time Horizons for Risk Assessment 
Three types of time horizons are normally adopted for risk assessment. 
• Real time operation risk assessment, used to provide guidelines for real time system 
operation. The risk assessment is often carried out less than one hour before the 
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Figure 1.1 Composition of security 
operation time. 
• Short term operation risk assessment, used to provide cost and benefit analysis for 
short term economic decision making. The time horizon is about one day to one 
week. 
• Long term planning risk assessment, used to provide information for facility plan­
ning, long term economic decision making, determination of service charges, etc. 
The time horizon is one year or more. 
The shorter the time, the easier it is to identify the system trajectory, however, more 
modeling details of the system can be considered. On the other hand, the longer the 
time, the more attention has to be paid for system trajectory identification, so that 
fewer modeling details are considered. This dissertation mainly deals with planning risk 
assessment. One year risk assessment is performed on a test system, the IEEE RTS' 96. 
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However the proposed fundamental framework can also be applied to other systems for 
other long time horizons as well. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The objectvie of this dissertation is to develop an effective framework and a set of 
algorithms to calculate cumulative risk assessment for one year. Only thermal overload 
risk assessment and power flow infeasiblity risk assessment are addressed to limit the 
scope. Both adequacy and security risk are considered and combined together to get the 
composite risk. The purpose of the risk assessment is to answer the following practical 
questions. 
• When will the system suffer severe risk? 
• Where will the system suffer severe risk? 
• Which contingency plays the key role in causing risk? 
• What is the main cause of risk? Thermal overload, generation limit, or voltage 
stability? 
• If we make alternative decisions, will the risk be significantly reduced? By how 
much? 
Answers to these questions are useful in making decisions about alternatives having 
varying degrees of risk and expected benefit. 
In the era of deregulation, risk assessment has to conform to the needs of the dereg­
ulated environment. This means risk assessment has to have the following features. 
• It should accommodate appropriate uncertainties. Due to the competition in the 
power market, we believe load and generation will become more and more uncer­
10 
tain. Thus load forecasting error and the control eflfect of generators should be 
included in our model. 
• It should be deccniposable and assignable. The power system is no longer con­
trolled by a single vertical company in the deregulated market, it is a complicated 
system owned by various companies. Therefore, identifying the allocation of risk 
among different companies becomes very important. Knowing a single risk assess­
ment number for the system is not enough. We have to provide tools to calculate 
who suffers how much risk and who is responsible for this risk. 
1.3 Structure of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 proposes a new system trajectory model and compares it with two other 
models, then proposes a framework to perform cumulative risk assessment. Chapter 3 
illustrates techniques we adopt to identify system trajectory and its uncertainty, includ­
ing load forecasting error identification, maintenance scheduling, and unit commitment 
arrangement. Chapter 4 elaborates how to use the interior point algorithm to calcu­
late power flow infeasibility risk. Chapter 5 explains our proposed method for thermal 
overload risk assessment based on convolution and DC power flow. Chapter 6 combines 
thermal overload risk and power flow infeasibility risk to get the composite risk, iden­
tifies the weak time period and weak area of the IEEE RTS'96, proposes alternative 
facility plans and unit commitment patterns, and performs cost and benefit comparison. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the work we have done and proposes possible future research 
directions.In order to show our philosophy and keep the consistency, we adopt the IEEE 
RTS 96 system as the example system throughout this dissertation. However, this does 
not prevent readers from applying our proposed philosophy on any other power systems. 
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CHAPTER 2 OVERVIEW OF CUMULATIVE RISK 
ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the main features of our risk assessment framework is to first identify the 
power system trajectory over a period of time, then perform risk eissessment based on the 
identified trajectory model. There are several classes of system trajectory representation 
models available currently. This chapter first addresses comparisons between different 
models, then introduces our cumulative risk assessment framework based on our own 
system trajectory model. 
2.2 Comparison of Three System Trajectory Models 
The system trajectory model is very important in annual risk assessment. If the 
model is chosen too simple, accuracy can not be guaranteed. Yet if the model is overly-
complicated, computation is too burdensome. One has to balance between accuracy and 
complexity requirements. According to different accuracy and complexity, there are at 
least two classes of models available currently. 
2.2.1 Snapshot Models 
The earliest and most common class of models we call the snapshot models, employed 
by well known software products such as PROCOSE [19], TRELSS [20], and others. In 
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this class, several typical snapshots of loadings are chosen according to experience. Then 
for every snapshot, unit commitment is arranged and reliability indices are computed. 
The cumulative risk is just a weighted average of the indices accross the various snap­
shots, where weights are relative probabilities assigned to the snapshots. Because of the 
simplicity of this model, risk assessment or reliability evaluation can be performed fairly 
quickly. Typically the number of the snapshots are quite limited, and engineering judge­
ment is used to choose them. However, this method does not account for intertemporal 
dependencies such as those that occur due to start up and shut down of generators. 
It is hard to capture peak risk time periods accurately because they may not occur at 
extreme loading conditions. As we will show in chapters 5 and 6, peak risk frequently 
occurs when a load increment is just below that necessary to cause a unit commitment 
change, or a load decrement is just at the point to cause a unit commitment change. 
2.2.2 Sequential Trajectory Models 
The second class of models is called sequential trajectory models. It simulates the 
system trajectory hour by hour over a whole year. Therefore it has to calculate main­
tenance schedule and unit commitment for generators. Then the risk assessment or 
reliability evaluation is calculated based on the simulated trajector>' (or trajectories). 
One such model called sequential Monte Carlo (MC) simulation model has already been 
proposed in [21]. The model simulates the power system sequentially hour by hour until 
the whole year is finished, then repeats the simulation using randomly chosen trajec­
tories until risk assessment (or reliability evaluation) becomes numerically stable. This 
model can provide the most accurate result. However, it is ver}' computationally inten­
sive. This is of particular significance for risk decomposition purposes where we desire 
to identify who causes and incurs risk because early termination of the simulations can 
result in erroneous zero risk assignment to some agents. In order to obtain accurate risk 
assessment for every hour and every component, several million simulations must be 
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performed. Currently, such a calculation requirement can not be handled by a standard 
work station within a reasonable time period for typical size power systems. Therefore, 
this model is normally used to calculate system indices rather than individual component 
risk or risk v/ith respect to certain hours. 
2.2.3 Sequential Mean-Variance Model 
Based on the analysis and comparison of the snapshot model and the sequential MC 
simulation model, we propose a new model called the sequential mean-variance (MV) 
model. It belongs to the second class. However, it is completely different from the 
sequential MC simulation model in that it has only one expected system trajectory 
instead of thousands of possible system trajectories. In this model, we assume we know 
that we have the expected load profile over the next year. Then we can use it to arrange 
maintenance schedule and unit commitment. The expected load profile can be obtained 
from load forecasting, or it can be the load profile of previous year, expanded by, say, a 
3-5% increment. It is reasonable for us to assume that the system trajectory obtained 
by this method is the expected system trajectory. Then we should also include variances, 
so that at every time point, every load is modeled according to a Gaussian distribution. 
Furthermore, we assume that the variances of the loads are equal at any time point. We 
adopt one day ahead load forecasting error as the relative error of a load. We use one 
day ahead error because 
• Most costly situations occur within 24 hours of a contingency. 
• Any cost having potential to occur after a 24 hour period can be largely eliminated 
via operation action. 
• There exists one day ahead market in many restructured power systems. 
14 
The total load forecasting error is then proportionally distributed among all loads. If 
we have enough data, the covariance matrix of loads can also be identified via statistical 
methods. In this dissertation, we assume this data is available. Our model considers 
the sequence of the unit commitment, therefore it can capture peak risk periods easily. 
It includes load variances, therefore it can perform probabilistic analysis. For a reason­
able time period like one year, one can decompose risk among components and hours 
accurately. 
2.2.4 Comparison of Three Trajectory Models 
A comparison of these three trjactory models is shown in Table 2.1. 
From this table, we can see that our sequential MV model 
• is faster than the sequential MC model; 
• is more accurate than the snapshot model; 
• is risk decomposable; 
• can capture peak risk time period accurately. 
Table 2.1 The compp -ison of three trajectory models 
Model Name snapshot sequential 
MC 
sequential 
MV 
speed fast slow fast 
accuracy low high high 
risk 
decomposable? 
yes almost 
impractical 
yes 
ability to 
capture peak 
risk 
low high high 
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2.3 Framework of Annual Risk Assessment 
In [22] the risk-based security assessment approach is proposed. The main idea of 
this approach is to use risk measured in dollars instead of reliability indices to evaluate 
the security level of components and systems. The definition of risk is explained in 
Chapter 1. In this dissertation, we extend the risk-based security assessment (RBSA) 
approach to the facility planning problem. Here, we desire to compute risk over a time 
period, say one year, for the purpose of deciding among different planning alternatives. 
Our approach is to simulate the system on an hour by hour basis, compute risk for each 
hour, and then accumulate the risk over the time period. We call the result a cumulative 
risk, given by the expression below 
where T is the time duration of the study period, Q. is the system trajectory during T, 
Ei is contingency state i, Pr is probability, and Im is some kind of impact(e.g., voltage 
collapse, load curtailment, thermal overload). 
Our framework of annual risk assessment is shown in Figure 2.1. It is decomposed into 
two modules. One module is used to identify system trajectory model. The other module 
(included within a dotted line) is used to perform various kinds of risk assessment. The 
risk assessment module is enclosed by a dotted line because we want to emphasize the 
submodules in this module. After each cumulative risk assessment, the facility plan 
and unit commitment is adjusted based on our risk assessment results. Then risk of 
alternative plans can be calculated and compared. 
In the system trajectory identification module, the expected system trajectory and 
the load forecasting error are identified by 
1. Developing an hour by hour load forecast. 
2. Identifying and modeling the error associated with the load forecast. 
Risk{Im\T,Q) = f f Pr{Ei\t,Q) • Im{Ei\t,Q)dEidt 
JT J  EX 
(2.1) 
lO 
Trajectory Development 
_r 
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Schedule 
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History Data 
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risk 
Power flow infeasi 
bility risk 
Update 
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inadequacy 
risk 
Oscillatory 
Risk 
Risk 
Module 
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Decomposed risk 
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Figure 2.1 Cumulative risk assessment framework 
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3. Forming a maintenance schedule for all generation units. 
4. Developing a unit commitment plan based on the load forecast and the mainte­
nance schedule. 
In order to show the effectiveness of our framework, we adopt ARIMA model to 
identify the load forecasting error, equal LOLP criterion to determine the maintenance 
schedule, and priority list method to determine the unit commitment. However, we 
do not purpose that these methods are best nor do we claim that our implementation 
of them can not be improved. We do claim and illustrate that an expected trajectory 
can be obtained and given that, we may perform a cumulative risk assessment over an 
extended time period such as a year. Our current research results point out several 
research directions that are useful for cumulative risk assessment. 
Given that we have the trajectory of operating conditions, we accumulate the com­
posite risk at each hour to get annual composite risk in the risk assessment module. As 
shown in Figure 2.1, this module can include thermal overload risk assessment, power 
flow infeasibility risk assessment, steady state instability risk assessment and transient 
instability risk assessment. Power flow infeasibility risk assessment is a new concept 
proposed in this dissertation to assess the risk associated with power flow infeasibility. 
Power flow infeasibility is caused by voltage risk and/or generation inadequacy risk. The 
two types of risk can be calculated together and presented in a decomposed fashion. We 
will provide a detailed explanation of this concept in Chapter 4. Thermal overload risk 
is the risk suffered due to life shortening or sagging when a component is thermally 
overloaded. Oscillatory instability risk is a risk suffered when the system is oscillatorily 
unstable. Transient instability risk is a risk suffered when a credible contingency causes 
transient instability problem. After the risk assessment of the four modules, the com­
posite risk can be calculated by summing them together. The risk decomposition among 
hours, components and contingencies can also be obtained and used to adjust facility 
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plan and unit commitment. In our work on the planning problem, however, we have 
only included two submodules: power flow infeasibility submodule and thermal overload 
risk assessment submodule. The composite risk and decomposed risk are also calculated 
only based on these two submodules. Therefore we have not included the ability to 
compute cumulative risk for transient instability or oscillatory instability. Our decision 
to exclude assessment of these risks was made based only on our ability to complete the 
work during the project time frame. 
Component outages and load uncertainties are considered at each hour. However, 
this increases the complexity of risk assessment. Normally, Monte Carlo simulation is 
adopted by other researchers to solve similar calculation problems, whereas we design 
clever algorithms to avoid MC simulation in this dissertation. Compared with MC 
method, our algorithms can identify the contribution of each outage, the risk suffered 
by each component, and risk due to different reasons (whether it is due to generation 
limit, voltage limit or voltage stability), with much less computation time. 
The results of the risk calculation may be provided in a "decomposed" form, by 
security problem type, by electrical facility type, or by electrical facility owner. The 
results of the composite and decomposed risk are used to modify the facility plan or to 
identify problems in the short-term operating strategies such as the unit commitment. 
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CHAPTER 3 IDENTIFICATION OF SYSTEM 
TRAJECTORY MODEL 
3.1 Introduction 
For our sequential mean variance model, we assume that the system trajectory is 
completely specified by the expected load profile, the load forecasting error, the main­
tenance schedule and the unit commitment. We assume we know the expected load 
profile. The main purpose of this chapter is to show how we determine the load fore­
casting error, the maintenance schedule and the unit commitment. The three problems 
can be solved independently, or they can be solved in an integrated fashion. The latter 
method typically results in a more optimal trajectory, but it is more complicate and 
computationally expensive. Rather, we choose to solve them independently in order to 
maintain model simplicity ami enhance computational efficiency. 
In each of the three modules, there are several alternative methods. We do not claim 
that the method adopted by us in each module is the best one. Our main contribution 
in this dissertation is not to propose the best method to identify load forecasting error, 
or maintenance schedule, or unit commitment. Our main contribution is to illustrate 
that we can combine them together to obtain a system trajectory, and based on this 
trajectory we can perform risk assessment. Therefore, in the remaining sections of this 
chapter, we provide the overview of the methods we adopt; the analytical details of each 
method is relegated to the appendices. 
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3.2 Load Forecasting Error Identification 
The forecasted load, or the expected load profile of the IEEE RTS'96 is shown in 
Figure 3.1. This forecasted load profile may be developed from any desirable method. 
However, there always exist a load forecasting error so that the actual load at a time is 
not exactly equal to the corresponding forecasted load. One merit of our risk assessment 
framework is that we can account for such an uncertainty in our risk assessment. The 
introduction of load forecasting error in our load model makes our calculation more 
rejisonable and accurate. However, it also brings the problem of how to identify the load 
forecasting error. This section is aimed at explaining the method we adopted to identify 
the load forecasting error. 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r r 
0.31 I ' 1 1 I I I I 
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 
t (hour) 
Figure 3.1 The expected load profile 
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There are many techniques available today to forecast load: time series, artificial 
neural network (ANN), fuzzy logic, chaos, etc. Time series forecasting theory has devel­
oped very fast during the last three decades, largely due to the requirement of describing 
economic and some specific physical behaviours. Box and Jenkins developed a system­
atic theory named after them in 1960's [23] [24] [25] [26]. The emergence of FFT in 
1965 [27] brought us a powerful tool to handle stochastic digital time series signals in 
frequency domain. The widely used Kalman filter techniques [28] enable us to estimate 
a set of loads instead of one load point. A long list of literature reveals people's sus­
tained interest in applying artifial neural network (ANN) in time series forecasting [29], 
[30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36]. Fuzzy logic theory [37] and chaos [38] theory have 
become competitive alternatives to time series and ANN. Methods combining ANN and 
fuzzy logic have been proposed [39] [40] [41] [42]. Some commercial programs such as 
NPREDICT are on sale [29], which enable determination of the point estimate and the 
variance at each time step. However, no forecast tool is perfect. Errors are inevitable. 
And the forecasting results of different models can not be simply compared by the mag­
nitude of estimated errors (because error estimation comes from history data, not future 
data). However, a good estimator's forecasting error series should approximate a white 
noise, otherwise the error series can be further represented by time series models and the 
overall load forecasting model can be improved by doing so. Therefore, it is natural for 
us to decompose the load forecasting into two parts: one is for load model identification 
and the other is for error series analysis. In load model identification, any kind of model 
mentioned previously can be applied. In error series analysis, time series techniques 
can be applied to improve the forecasting by whitening the errors. Since time series 
theories are well developed and can identify the load model and whiten the error series 
simultaneously, we choose a typical time series model, i.e., the autoregressive integrated 
moving average (ARIMA) model to fit the data. Of course, we can also use ANN or 
fuzzy or chaos models to represent load series. However, the obtained error series may 
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not be a white noise and we have to use the time series model again on the error series 
to improve the forecasting accuracy. 
We take the following steps to identify load forecasting error. 
1. Perform spectrum analysis to detect the seasonality. 
2. Detrend the seasonality. 
3. For the detrended signal, use an autocorrelation function curve or partial autocor­
relation function curve to determine the order of this signal. 
4. Estimate paramters of AR and MA parts independently. 
5. Use the identified model to forecast load and identify the one-day-ahead load 
forecasting error. 
The forecasted load and 95% confidence interval for the next week is shown in Figure 
3.2. From this figure we can see that the error is small during the next week. Therefore 
our forecast is accurate. The estimated square root load forecasting error vs. time curve 
is shown in Figure 3.3. From this figure we can see that the further away the future is, 
the more uncertain the forecast becomes. 
We have assumed that each load value used in our trajectory has associated with 
it some error. This error characterizes the potential for deviation away from the load 
forecast for which the system coordinator (perhaps the independent system operator) is 
unable to make effective and economically efficient adjustments. We assume that such 
adjustments would be possible given more than a one-day advance warning by using 
the day-ahead electricity market, but they would not be possible for advance warning 
less than one day. Therefore, we use the estimated error of a one-day forecast in our 
work. This estimated error was computed by averaging the errors of a day-ahead load 
forecast as compared with historical data, over one year. The estimated one day ahead 
load forecasting error is 1.92% by our program. The details are shown in Appendix B. 
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Figure 3.2 The forecasted load and 95% confidence interval for the next 
week 
3.3 Maintenance Scheduling 
Our maintenance schedule problem is: given the expected load profile, how to arrange 
maintenance schedules of generation units in order to minimize the economic cost? In 
order to narrow our problem, we assume only generation units need maintenance work, 
i.e., we do not consider maintenance of transmission circuits. 
Maintenance scheduling for critical system components is a traditional problem in­
vestigated not only for power systems, but as well for other industries, where reliability 
and security are essential. It is still an important research issue today. Researchers try 
to solve two basic problems currently: 
1. Optimization problem: given history data, how do we minimize a utility function, 
which is usually an economic cost? 
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Figure 3.3 The estimated square root error vs. time curve 
2. Adaptive adjustment: if there is an on-line monitor for the aging of materials, how 
do we adjust or rearrange maintenance schedule according to monitored data? 
The optimization model is typically posed in terms of a stochastic programming 
problem [?], however, it can also be solved by a deterministic method [44]. Since the 
problem is usually very complicated, traditionally it is solved by applying equal reserve 
criterion or equal Loss Of Load Probability (LOLP) criterion [45]. Equal reserve criterion 
requires us to make the total reserve curve over a year as level as possible, on the other 
hand, equal LOLP criterion requires us to make the LOLP curve over a year as level as 
possible. There are several ways to make use of the equal LOLP criterion. The most 
accurate one is to form the integer 0-1 programming model, whose objective function is 
to minimize the summation of LOLP, or the variance of the LOLP curve. However, this 
method is complex and time consuming. Another traditionally used method is to make 
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use of the effective load carrying capacities of units to flatten the equivalent load profile. 
This is the one we used in our program. In order to avoid computational burden, the 
transmission constraints are ignored. 
Recently, with the development of computers and computation techniques, more and 
more researchers take transmission constraints into account and solve the optimization 
problem directly. They solve the optimization problem by various methods. Some use 
iterative programming [44], some use simulated annealing [46], some use the Hopfield 
neural network [47]. Some researchers, on the other hand, investigate the influence of 
on-line monitoring on the maintenance scheduling [48] [49]. 
We prefer to apply equal LOLP criterion by using effective load carrying capacities 
of units because of the following reasons. 
• Our main task is to develop and illustrate the whole planning stage risk assessment 
framework, not a single maintenance problem. Therefore traditional methods with 
simple algorithms and stable behavior are preferable than modern sophisticated 
algorithms. 
• The method we adopt has been used for years. Its effectiveness is proven by time. 
Other methods may be attractive and could be considered in the future. 
We use the daily peak load curve here to arrange maintenance schedule because it is 
normally adopted in maintenance scheduling currently. Other methods based on hourly 
peak load curve may be attractive and could be considered in the future. 
In order to introduce the basic idea of our method, we first introduce the concept of 
effective load carrying capacity. When a generation unit is started, not all of its capacity 
can be used as load reserve. Because it has forced outage rate, some of its capacity must 
be reserved to compensate for its outage and keep the system at the same LOLP level 
from a statistical point of view. What remains of its capacity is the effective capacity 
26 
to support load, called the effective load carrying capacity. The effective load carrying 
capacity of each unit can be calculated based on the system LOLP vs. reserve curve. 
The influence of a unit in maintenance to the power system is tantamont to increasing 
the load by its load carrying capacity during its maintenance time period. Under the 
equal LOLP criterion, we desire the equivalent load curve over a year to be as level as 
possible. Therefore, we take the following steps to arrange the maintenance schedule. 
1. Reorder the effective load carrying capacities (ELCC) of generators from the largest 
to the smallest. 
2. Pick up one ELCC from the list in order, look up for the required number of 
maintenance days (denoted by m). 
3. Calculate all summations of the m successive load, find the smallest one, arrange 
unit there. 
4. If this is the last unit, stop; else move to the next unit, go to 2. 
Figure 3.4 shows the original daily load curve over a year. Figure 3.5 shows the 
equivalent daily load curve over a year after we have arranged the maintenance schedule. 
We see that the equivalent daily load curve is more level than the original daily load 
curve. It proves that our technique to levelize the system LOLP is effective. 
3.4 Unit Commitment Arrangement 
When load demand is low, it is not economic to turn all generators on. Therefore, 
the start up and shut down schedule of generation units should be carefully arranged to 
minimize the fuel consumption cost. This problem is called unit commitment problem. 
It can be expressed as a nonlinear optimization model with integer 0-1 variables. 
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Figure 3.4 The daily peak load curve 
In operations, unit commitment (UC) schedules are normally computed for only a few 
weeks (or less) in advance because of load uncertainty and because of the computational 
burden. However, the operational goal is to set a specific UC schedules, and therefore the 
assessment must accurately reflect the actual condition of the short term time interval. 
In using our one-year £issessment, we are more interested in obtaining a trajectory that 
reflects expected conditions and is reasonable, for the purpose of probing the system's 
weaknesses. As a consequence, we use a very efficient, but approximate UC scheduling 
calculation to determine a full year's UC schedule. This schedule would of course serve 
as a long term plan which can be adjusted by more exact, weekly UC calculations. 
Traditional unit commitment calculation algorithms such as Lagrange relaxation 
algorithm [50] and genetic algorithm [51] are short term oriented algorithms. When one 
year is considered, a dynamic programming calculation for one unit and one year will 
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Figure 3.5 The daily equivalent load curve after maintenance arrangement 
require 8 to 10 minites on a 166 MHz HP station. In each iteration of the Lagrange 
relaxation algorithm, the dynamic programming calculation has to be apphed to each 
generation unit. There are tens of units in a normal power system. Furthermore, the 
Lagrange relaxation algorithm normally requires tens or even hundreds of iterations. 
Therefore, the Lagrange relaxation algorithm has to do thousands or even more than tens 
of thousands of the dynamic programming calculations. It is extremely time consuming 
to use Lagrange relaxation method. Genetic algorithm (GA) and dynamic programming 
are also computational for such a big problem. In this situation, the priority list method 
is very attractive [52]. It is simple, fast, and it can give us a feasible but suboptimal 
solution. There are no reported instances in the literature of unit commitment solved 
by priority list with hydro-thermal coordination. In this dissertation, we propose a 
technique to deal with hydro-thermal coordination. Furthermore, we adopt a piecewise 
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linear model for fuel consumption curve, which is more suitable in a deregulated power 
market. Our basic idea for the priority list method is as follows. 
1. Since all fuel consumption curves of thermal units are linearized, the marginal 
costs of thermal units are within a limited set. 
2. There is a system marginal price at each hour. It is the lowest acceptable price for 
generation companies to increase the total generation of the system. 
3. The allocation of hydro energy can be adjusted by a psuedo price. If the hydro 
energy price is larger than the system marginal price at some hour, hydro energy 
should not be consumed at that hour. If the hydro energy price is smaller than 
the system marginal price at some hour, hydro energy should be fully used to 
substitute thermal energy at that hour. If the hydro energy price is the same as 
the marginal thermal energy price at some hour, we can allocate hydro power at 
will between its minimum and its maximum at that hour. 
4. The psudo hydro energy price should be within the limited marginal cost set. We 
can pick up one possible psudo hydro energy price randomly from the limited 
marginal cost set first. Then the reasonable hydro energy consumption of a season 
should be a range covering the maximum hydro energy constraint. If the hydro 
energy consumption range is below the maximum hydro energy constraint, the 
chosen psudo hydro energy price is too expensive, we should lower it; if the hydro 
energy consumption range is above the maximum hydro energy constraint, the 
chosen psudo hydro energy price is too cheap, we should raise it. By adjusting the 
psudo hydro energy price, we can allocate hydro-thermal coordination and arrange 
unit commitment further by thermal-only priority list method. 
As far as the IEEE RTS'96 system is concerned, according to our unit commitment 
arrangement, the system total fuel cost for one year is $ 2.54 x 10®. The duality gap is 
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0.43. It means the real optimal fuel cost should be between $ 1.78 x 10® and $ 2.54 x 10®. 
We are satisfied with cur suboptimal solution. Moreover, the power flow calculations 
for all hours converge. The details of our unit commitment calculation are provided in 
Appendix D. In addition, we provide a review of Lagrange relaxation method in order 
to illuminate the reason for choosing the priority list method. 
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CHAPTER 4 POWER FLOW INFEASIBILITY RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
The concept of power flow infeasibilty risk is proposed in this dissertation. We 
describe this concept and then provide algorithmic details in the later sections. The 
solution of the power flow equations is a fundamental problem in power system analysis. 
We use the feeisible region to denote the set of points where the power flow equations 
have a solution and all system parameters (e.g., line flows, bus voltages, generations) are 
within their limits. We use the infeasible region to denote the set of points where the 
power flow equations have a solution, but where one or more limits are violated. We use 
the unsolvable region to denote the set of points where the power flow equations have 
no real solution. Figure 4.1, proposed in reference [53], illustrates the concepts of the 
three security regions. Therefore, if we can not find a feasible power flow solution for a 
system state, we call the system state infeasible; if we can not find a power flow solution 
at all, we call the system state unsolvable. 
Infeasibility has various causes, including 
1. The load exceeds the available generation capacity. 
2. The load exceeds the voltage instability level. 
3. A bus voltage limit is violated. 
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Figure 4.1 Power flow security regions 
4. A branch flow limit is violated. 
Of these, the first three can be alleviated by taking action to reduce the system 
demand. Because this action incurs a direct cost, it is an approximate measure of the 
impact corresponding to the condition which led to it. This comprises the fundamental 
idea of this section. 
Given a trajectory of operating condition over a time interval, for each hour and 
each outage condition, we compute the maximum loadability of the system, a value that 
primarily depends on the unit commitment. The amount by which the hour's load exceeds 
the system maximum loadability is a measure of the impact corresponding to that loading 
and outage condition. 
There are several related ideas required to complete the picture of the approach 
presented in this section, as follows. 
Maximum Loadability Found By Optimization 
We obtain maximum loadability for a given network and unit commitment by solving 
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a constrained optimization problem. In this problem, the objective function is the total 
demand, which is maximized, and constraints include the power flow equations, real and 
reactive generation limits, and bus voltage limits. 
System Based or Zone Based 
Load increase occurs at each bus in the system in proportion to the percentage of 
total load initially located at the bus. In some cases, however, it is more realistic to 
group load buses into zones, so that load changes in each zone are dictated by a specified 
zone weight between 0 and 1, where higher weights cause heavier load increases. 
Reduced Number of Loadability Calculations 
The maximum loadability must be found for each outage at each hour of the study 
period. However, since the calculation depends on only the network configuration (which 
includes the topology and the unit commitment), we need perform the calculation only 
for each outage and for each unit commitment. This greatly reduces the computational 
burden because the number of different unit commitment patterns is typically much less 
than 8760 hours. 
Risk Calculation 
We model each hour's total load as a normally distributed random variable having 
a mean equal to the forecasted value for the hour and standard deviation equal to one 
day ahead forecast error. Given the hour's maximum loadability, we can compute cost 
of the expected curtailed load. The expected curtailed load is found according to 
where Lmax is the maximum loadability and ftix) is the probability distribution for the 
load of the hour, as illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
Overload Risk Not Included 
The risk associated with overload is not included in the power flow infeasibility risk 
calculation. The reason is that overload risk is not directly alleviated by load curtailment. 
x f L { x ) d x  (4.1) 
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Figure 4.2 The expected curtailed load 
Therefore, the load curtailment required to eliminate an overload mry significantly over­
estimate the associated risk. The algorithm which we use to compute overload risk is 
described in the next chapter. 
Risk Is Assignable 
We can decompose the risk calculation to identify risk contributed from and incurred 
by each component and therefore each facility owner as well. In addition, shadow prices 
obtained from the optimization solution can be used to predict changes in risk caused 
by changes in system conditions. 
4.2 Previous Work 
Voltage stability reliability evaluation has been done by Aboreshaid and Billinton 
in [54], and Melo, Mello, and Granville in [55] with two different methods. Reference 
[54] uses two indices, one is a stability indicator and the other is a load multiplication 
factor. The main task is to calculate the indices, so that if the stability indicator 
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exceeds a threshold, the system is regarded as voltage unstable. The meaning of load 
multiplication factor is explained thoroughly in [58]. 
Reference [55] considers an entire year's load scenario with load uncertainty, and it 
uses the Monte Carlo simulation to generate system states. The interior point algorithm 
is employed to calculate the minimum load curtailment. Several reliability mdices are 
calculated. However, for hourly risk assessment over a year, we believe that this approach 
requires prohibitive computation in order to achieve an acceptable accuracy. 
As far as the interior point algorithm is concerned, references [56] and [57] proposes 
two different methods. We simplified their methods by eliminating some equations. This 
makes our equations about one forth the number of their equations. 
4.3 Outage Model 
Our outage model, which is used for both power flow infeasibility risk assessment 
and overload risk assessment, include single component outage for all branches and 
generators and also double line outage (i.e., "common mode") of transmission lines in 
the same corridor. Each outage constitutes a unique "state". The normal condition for 
which there is no outage, is also a state. 
Denote Ns to be the total number of states considered, with the normal state num­
bered 1. Also, denote Plj as component j's outage probability in an hour. The proba­
bility of having state i occur in the next hour is denoted as Pi , given by 
N. 
Pi=Ph-i n (1 - (4-2) 
j=1 
j ^ i - l  
We note that state i corresponds to component outage i — 1 because here, we have 
numbered the normal state as 1. The probability of having the normal state in the next 
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hour is 
P, = 11(1 - Plj) (4.3) 
J=2 
The common mode Markov chain model is shown in Figure 4.3 [12]. 
Denote Aj, Aj to be the failure rate of line i and j respectively. For thermal overload, 
permanent outage rates should be adopted because thermal overload is a relatively long 
time scale problem. Assuming the proportion for one line outage to develop to common 
mode outage is a = 0.075 for all common mode failures, then the common mode outage 
rate is 
A,J = Q(Ai + Xj) (4.4) 
1 Down 
2 Up 
1 Up 
2 Up 
1 Down 
2 Down 
1 Down 
2 Down 
Figure 4.3 Common model Markov chain model 
1 Up 
2 Down 
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when the failure rates for the two lines are very small. The failures of a common mode 
outage often occur at the same place on the same tower. Assuming we have enough 
crews to repair failures, we can choose the repairing time as the maximum repairing 
time of line i and line j, or 
where /z is the repairing rate, it is the inverse of the repairing time. Thus we can calculate 
the forced outage rate (FOR) for the common mode as follows. 
Some contingencies may cause isolated islands. In our program, those islands are 
individually dealt with. 
4.4 One Zone Model for Power System Maximum Loadability 
Let us begin from a maximum loadability problem. Suppose all loads vary propor­
tionally at any time. That means the whole power system is considered as a whole zone. 
The optimization problem is as follows 
H i j  = min(^i,/ij) (4.5) 
max^(P£)s) 
where G{PDz) = PDJ: = Y!k=\ subject to 
(4.7) 
Pgk - PdkPpL - Pek = 0, k = 1, - • • ,N 
Qgk QdkPo^ Qek ~ 0) k — , N (4.9) 
(4.10) 
(4.11) 
(4.12) 
(4.8) 
gkmtn gk ^ jkmaxj 
^kmin ^ ^k ^ ^kmaxi ^ € fit) 
where 
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9{PD 'L) is the objective function of loads. In this case, it is the total summation 
of loads, which is also represented by Pde • 
Pgk is the active generation power at bus k. 
Qgk is the reactive generation power at bus k. 
Pdk is the ratio constant for Pok/Po^, where Ppk is the active load at bus k. We 
always have Ylk=i Pdk = 'i- • 
Qdk is the ratio constant for Qok/PoT., where Qok is the reactive load at bus k. 
Pjkminj Pgkmcai Qgkmin: Qgkmaxi ^kminy ^kmax ^-^e lower and Upper bounds for 
Pgk, Qgk and Vk respectively. 
fip is a set of buses which has Pg as a variable. We do not use the generation bus 
set because when Pgkmin = Pgk — Pgkmax, Pgk becomcs a constant rather than a 
variable, bus k is then unnecessary to be included into fip. 
Qq is a set of buses which has Qg as a. variable. 
fiu is a set of buses which has V as a variable. 
N is the number of buses. 
Pek, Qek are the real and reactive power injections obtained from the power flow 
equations: 
N  
Pek = Vk ^ YkiVi cos{9k — 6t — 4>ki) (4.13) 
1=1 
N 
Qek = Vk'^YkiVis\n{thetak - Oi - 4>ki) (4.14) 
/=! 
where Y is the admittance matrix of the network, 6 is the bus voltage angle, 
<t>kl = ^ Yki. 
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The model can be written in a generalized form as follows. 
min g{z,y) (4.15) 
subject to 
h { z , y )  = 0  
Z I  <  Z  <  Z N  
where z is a variable vector with boundaries, j/ is a variable vector without boundaries. 
Instead of solving this problem directly, we solve the following alternative problem 
m i n g { z , y )  - /x^lnSuj - ^ ^Ins/j (4.16) 
J j 
subject to 
h { z , y )  = 0 (4.17) 
2 + - 2u = 0 (4.18) 
z — Si — zi = 0 (4.19) 
This formulation results in solution by the direct interior point algorithm. The 
barrier items added in the objective function keep the solution point within the range. 
Denote (2*, y') and (2", y") to be the optimal solutions of the two problems 4.15 and 4.16, 
respectively. Then if 2* is on the boundary, when /j, is large, 2° tends to be deeper in the 
interior of the region, but the optimization function tends to be smoother, which makes 
the algorithm less prone to oscillate. When n is small, 2° tends to be more approximate 
to 2* , but the optimization function has sharp turns near boundaries, which makes it 
hard to get the 2" solution. Therefore, a typical interior point algorithm always begins 
with a large /z , then makes /x smaller and smaller. Theoretically when /z -> 0, 2" -> z* 
. In practice, when /i is small enough, we can terminate the calculation. The Lagrange 
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function for problem 4.16 is as follows. 
L = g(z, ?/) - /XIns„j - stj - X'^h{z, y) - - K J{Z -  S < -  zi) - ttJ(z + s„ - 2„) 
3 i 
(4.20) 
The KKT first order optimality condition gives the following equations. 
V,I = JJA-TT,-7r„ = 0 (4.21) 
V y L  = Vj,^-Jj 'A-7jA = 0 (4.22) 
V,„I = - 7r„ = 0 (4.23) 
Va,L = + TTj = 0 (4.24) 
= -(2 + Su-2u)=0 (4.25) 
= -(2-s ,-2: , )  = 0 (4.26) 
VxL = -M2,2/)=0 (4.27) 
where , Jy = , e = [1,1,-•• ,1]^, = diag{suir-- Si = 
diag{sn, • • • , sj^)- Substituting expressions from our model into these equations, we get 
N  N  
— 1 + XpkPdk + \kQdk — 0 (4.28) 
ib=l k=l 
->^pk - - TTp-fc = 0, A; 6 fip (4.29) 
-\k - T^qk - = 0. ^ ^ ^^9 (4-30) 
1=1 * i = l * 
E vIp' + E - ''it - = 0, * € n, (4.32) 
/=1 * 1=1 
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Pgk - PdkPoE - ^efc = 0, k = 1, - • • ,N (4.33) 
Qgk — IdkPDt " Qek = 0, A: = 1, • • • , A'^ (4.34) 
TTuJfc = — (4.35) 
Suk 
Trik = —— (4.36) 
Slk 
z — Si — zi = 0 (4.37) 
2 + Su — 2u = 0 (4.38) 
where tt^ = [tt^, tt, = [ttJ, 2 = [Pg, Qg, Vf, X = [Ap, A,]^. Qe is the set 
of all buses except the swing bus. 
4.5 Model Reduction 
We can use a Newton-Raphson algorithm to solve these equations. However, the 
model is of very large dimension. In the worst case, it has 16N-3 variables and the same 
number of equations. It is possible to reduce the dimensionality by substituting some 
variables with others and eliminating some equations. 
From 4.35 to 4.38 we get 
1 1 TTjk = 7rj^ + 7r[ = n{ 
Substituting it into 4.29, 4.30 we get 
- 4 4-
) 
Xpk — ""pfc) k G fip 
Xqk — Xqki k G 
We can always find TTpjt and "Kqk such that 
Apfc ~ '^pki k ^ f2p 
Xqk — T^qki k ^ 
(4.39) 
(4.40) 
(4.41) 
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Eliminating A in 4.28, 4.31, 4.32 we get 
^ dP'J dQei 
tf 
^ dPel dQel _ -
dVk ^ ~ 
where 
/=i dVk 
k e ^ e  
keQ.0 
1=1 
Pgk — PdkPoZ — Pek = 0, k = - • ,N 
Qgk QdhPoH Qek — 0) = 1, • • • , 
AT N  
1 ^PkPdk + ^ ^qkQdk = 0 
k=l k=l 
TTp/ 
>  ' e n ,  
^5' ^j/min ^7<maz ^gl 
a variable , / ^ fip 
(4.42) 
(4.43) 
(4.44) 
(4.45) 
(4.46) 
(4.47) 
TT,/ = ^ Q9/—Qj/ mi 
a variable 
QgimL-Q,i^ ' 
, I 
(4.48) 
This set of equations only has 4N — 1 variables at the most, about 1/4 of the original 
set of equations. If we sum all equations in expression 4.44 together we get 
N 
PDi: = Pg^-Y^Pek (4.49) 
*=1 
Substitute it into 4.42 and 4.43, eliminate the equation in 4.42 corresponding to the 
swing bus, then we further reduce the number of equations to be at most AN — 2. 
4.6 Solution Algorithm and Shadow Prices 
Denote Jj, to be the big Jacobian matrix for 4.42-4.46, then we have 
Aa:* 
Ay* 
= -A""'/(j'.y') (4.50) 
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at every step, where /(• • • , • • •) is the left hand side function vector of the equations. 
However, we have to keep within the feasible region. Therefore, every time we have 
to choose maximum a such that z'^ + aAz* € 5, where S is the feasible region. Once we 
get a, we choose z^"^^ to be between 2* and 2* +/SaA2*, where ,/? = 0.9995. We desire to 
choose such that y'''^^)||oo is minimized, or at least less than ||/(2*, y'^)||oo-
The algorithm we adopt is as follows. 
1. Pick up a starting value n = ^0, calculate /o = |l/;io(2o> 2/o)||oo; set /i = /o||. 
2. If after 3 iterations ||/||oo reduces less than lO/o = ||/^(2,y)||cx3-
3. If ll/lloo < i^/i, or ll/lloo < 0.01, set m • 
4. If ll/lloo < ^ and /z < /Xmm, stop, where e and are small positive numbers 
chosen by the user; otherwise go to 2. 
Our approach calculates maximum loadability due to voltage stability, voltage limits, 
or generation limits. We also desire to identify binding constraints on the objective. 
The "shadow price" in our optimization model provides us full information for such 
discrimination. 
The "shadow price" refers to —TTp, —tt,, —7r„ in our model. From previous derivation, 
we know for a variable Zki 
Therefore, when z^ hits the upper bound, -Kzk < 0; when Zk hits the lower bound, 
TTzfc > 0; when Zk is far away from both bounds, is very near 0 as /i is near zero. 
On the other hand, according to optimization theories, Tr^jt can be interpreted as the 
decrement of the Lagrange function due to the per unit increment of the Zkmax when 
z* hits the upper bound, or the decrement of the Lagrange function due to the per 
unit decrement of the Zkmin when Zk hits the lower bound. Therefore it reflects the 
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price of the confined boundary. When Zk hits the upper bound, as Zkmax increases Azk, 
the total load will ii)icreai>e -n^kAzk, provided Azk is sufficiently small; when Azk hits 
the lower bound, as Zkmin increase Azk, the total load will decrease Tr^k^Zk, provided 
Azk is sufficiently srftall. Therefore —n^k always reflects a "price" of the corresponding 
boundary. 
In our program, use the following algorithm to identify the binding constraints. 
1. If TTpk < -£p fo^ all k € fip, where Sp is a positive threshold value, set type=l, the 
mRvimnm load^Wlity (ML) is confined by generation constraints. 
2. Otherwise, fine) the bus with the lowest voltage, denote the bus as bus m. 
• If TTym < where £„ is a positive threshold value, set type=2, the ML is 
confined by voltage stability. 
• Otherwise* set type=3, the ML is confined by voltage lower bound. 
4.7 Illustration of One Zone Model on IEEE RTS'96 
VSTAB contains ^ standard continuation power flow calculation program developed 
by Powertech Labs Ii^corparated [59]. We compare results from our software with those 
from VSTAB in orde^" to provide validation evidence. 
For the typical c^e of the IEEE RTS'96 system given in A.l, we choose bus 13 as 
the swing bus, relieve the generation limits at this bus to be ineffective, and fix all other 
active generation po^et. We also choose Knoi = l.OSjm, Imm — 0.9pu for all generation 
buses, and Vmax = Vmin = 0.85pu for all load buses. The maximum loadability 
calculated by our prt^gram is 4048 MW, while the VSTAB's calculation result is 4025 
MW. This shows that our software for maximum loadability calculation is correct. 
Our approach is ^ery attractive because, for a specified unit commitment, it can 
also identify the dispA.tch that maximizes loadability. As an illustration, we repeat the 
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previous calculation with real power injection at each generation bus defined as a decision 
parameter. This time, the maximum loadability increases to 4208 MW as a result of the 
optimized dispatch. Furthermore, we can activate the generation limits on the swing 
bus, which is required for a realistic solution, to identify maximum loadability of 3358 
MW. This value is 47 MW less than the installed capacity. This difference is due to 
losses in the transmission network. 
Now suppose we change the unit commitment to be as shown in Table 4.1, and 
change the swing bus to bus 23. Vmax is set to l.lOpu for generation buses, and 1.15pu 
for load buses. Vmin is set to 0.90pu for generation buses, and 0.85pu for load buses. 
The swing bus's voltage is set to 1.05pu. The Pg, Qg, V, TTp, tt,, 7r„ for all buses are shown 
in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.1 Unit commitment pattern for analysis 
I(in MW or MVar) 
Gen. bus p * gmax p . * gmin Qgmax Qgmin 
15 155 54.25 80 -50 
16 155 54.25 80 -50 
18 400 100.00 200 -50 
21 400 100.00 200 -50 
22 250 0.00 80 -50 
23 660 248.50 310 -125 
From this table, we can see TTp is near 0 for every generation bus. It means we 
can not increase the maximum loadability simply by increasing generation capacity at 
any generation bus. The ML is not confined by generation capacity. Now look at bus 
voltages. The minimum bus voltage is 0.85pu, corresponding to bus 7. The voltage 
hit the lower bound, therefore the corresponding tt^ is as high as 12.62. It means the 
ML is confined by the voltage lower bound. If we reduce the lower bound to 0.8pu, the 
ML increases from 1870 MW to 1905MW. Bus 7 remains to have the lowest voltage 
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Table 4.2 Shadow prices 
bus P9 Q9 V(pu) TTp TT, 7r„ 
1 0 0 0.9574 -1.3654 -1.7302 0.0009 
2 0 0 0.9573 -1.3849 -1.7385 0.0009 
3 0 0 0.9828 -0.5778 -1.2639 0.0003 
4 0 0 0.9507 -1.2107 -1.7204 0.0010 
5 0 0 0.9638 -1.3028 -1.7642 0.0007 
6 0 0 0.9742 -1.3236 -1.7868 0.0005 
7 0 0 0.8500 -3.4305 -4.5938 12.6217 
8 0 0 0.8786 -2.5304 -3.5117 0.0066 
9 0 0 0.9712 -0.8525 -1.6249 0.0006 
10 0 0 0.9896 -1.0572 -1.7493 0.0002 
11 0 0 0.9914 -0.5326 -1.1177 0.0002 
12 0 0 0.9691 -0.5114 -1.1127 0.0006 
13 0 0 0.9808 -0.4275 -0.9025 0.0004 
14 0 200.0 1.0566 -0.2927 -0.6958 -0.0035 
15 154.5 79.9 1.0746 -0.0392 -0.1939 -0.0071 
16 154.6 79.9 1.0741 -0.0516 -0.1963 -0.0069 
17 0 0 1.0910 -0.0144 -0.0632 -0.0027 
18 390.6 83.6 1.1000 -0.0022 0.0000 -4.9412 
19 0 0 1.0596 -0.0551 -0.1146 -0.0013 
20 0 0 1.0524 -0.0516 -0.0410 -0.0011 
21 374.7 64.0 1.1000 -0.0008 0.0000 -8.6093 
22 208.8 -33.1 1.0997 -0.0004 0.0011 -0.6943 
23 659.6 110.7 1.0500 -0.0486 0.0000 — 
24 0 0 1.0122 -0.1729 -0.6187 -0.0002 
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0.8197pu. This time, we come to the voltage stability saddle node. Now we investigate 
TT, for generation buses, we find bus 14's tt, = —0.6864, which is absolutely largest. It 
means bus 14's reactive power is not enough. If we increase bus 14's reactive power 
upper limit to 300 MVar, the ML increases to 1940MW. Qgu becomes 299.52 MVar, 
very near the upper bound. However, is only -0.0438, very near zero. Therefore, 
further increment in Qgus upper limit will not cause too much increment in the ML. 
In fact, when the upper limit increases to 400MVar, the ML becomes 1941MW, only 
IMW bigger than the 300 MVA's case. FVom this example, we can see that shadow 
prices are much better measurements for the ML type discrimination than distances 
from boundaries. 
From equations 4.47 and 4.48, it seems different /x may cause different "shadow 
prices". However, as ^ > 0, the "shadow prices" keeps constant when they are not 
near zero. For the previous example, as the final firnin varies from 0.01 to 1 x 10~®, the 
corresponding ML and TTp values are shown in Table 4.3. From the table, we can see 
when Urnin < 0.0001, the ML result does not change too much when reduces, all TTp 
values almost keep constant except for some absolutely very small values, which vanish 
very quickly (e.g., bus 21, 22). Therefore, choosing small enough will guarantee 
sufficient accuracy. In our program, we choose 
0.02 
f^min — (^*^2) 
n 
where n is the number of variables. 
4.8 Zone-Based Maximum Loadability 
In many applications, it is of interest to study the maximum loadability for only a 
subarea in a larger model. Also, it may be of interest to weight one area more heavily 
than another regarding load increase, to reflect actual load increase differences in the 
Table 4.3 The ML and TTp for different Umin 
bus f^min 
0.01 0.001 0.0001 0.00001 0.000001 
1 -1.3520 -1.3646 -1.3655 -1.3656 -1.3656 
2 -1.3706 -1.3841 -1.3850 -1.3851 -1.3852 
3 -0.5980 -0.5789 -0.5776 -0.5775 -0.5775 
4 -1.2043 -1.2104 -1.2108 -1.2108 -1.2108 
5 -1.2913 -1.3021 -1.3029 -1.3029 -1.3029 
6 -1.3101 -1.3228 -1.3237 -1.3238 -1.3238 
7 -3.2954 -3.4221 -3.4315 -3.4324 -3.4325 
8 -2.4514 -2.5256 -2.5310 -2.5315 -2.5316 
9 -0.8611 -0.8530 -0.8524 -0.8524 -0.8524 
10 -1.0556 -1.0571 -1.0572 -1.0572 -1.0572 
11 -0.5578 -0.5341 -0.5324 -0.5322 -0.5322 
12 -0.5391 -0.5132 -0.5111 -0.5110 -0.5110 
13 -0.4591 -0.4295 -0.4272 -0.4270 -0.4270 
14 -0.3280 -0.2948 -0.2925 -0.2923 -0.2922 
15 -0.0875 -0.0420 -0.0388 -0.0385 -0.0384 
16 -0.0991 -0.0544 -0.0512 -0.0509 -0.0509 
17 -0.0631 -0.0173 -0.0141 -0.0138 -0.0137 
18 -0.0527 -0.0052 -0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0014 
19 -0.1032 -0.0581 -0.0547 -0.0545 -0.0544 
20 -0.1005 -0.0547 -0.0512 -0.0509 -0.0509 
21 -0.0513 -0.0037 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0000 
22 -0.0461 -0.0030 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
23 -0.0980 -0.0518 -0.0483 -0.0480 -0.0479 
24 -0.2147 -0.1753 -0.1727 -0.1724 -0.1723 
Pdz 1861.68 1869.14 1870.02 1870.12 1870.13 
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system. Finally, in the case where the maximum loadability optimization algorithm 
does not converge, we would like to curtail in order to find a loading that does converge. 
In doing so, it is attractive if we can identify specific areas of the system where load 
curtailment is most effective. This also reflects that the loads of different areas can have 
different interruption priority, as indicated by the prices they pay. The optimization 
model for the zone-based maximum loadability problem is 
d 
maxPoE = WiPp-zi (4.53) 
t=i  
subject to 
Pgk — Pok ~ PdkPom " Pek =0, k £ Du (4.54) 
Qgk Qok ~ QdkPoLi ~ Qek ~ ^ ^ ^ii (4.55) 
i = 1, - • • ,d 
Pgkmin — Pgk — Pgkmaxi ^ € Clp (4.56) 
Qgkmin ^ Qgk ^ Qgkmaxi ^ G (4.57) 
^kmin ^ ^k ^ ^kmaxi ^ G 17^ (4.58) 
where i = 1, • • • , rf, £),• is the ith zone bus set, P^k^Q^k constant active and 
reactive parts of the load at bus k. The simplified KKT first order equations are as 
follows. 
(«9) 
+ + = 0, (4.60) 
ou 
Pgk - Pok ~ PdkPoU - Pek = 0, (4-61) 
k  =  l , - - -
Qgk - Q%k ~ QdkPoZi - Qek = 0, (4.62) 
k  =  l , - - -  , N  
dg 
- + rpkPdk + '^^ikQdk = 0, z = 1, • • • , d (4.63) 
dPoiii 
When upper and lower bounds are applied to P/jj. such that 
0 < PoZi < PoUmax (4.64) 
then the problem becomes the minimum load curtailment problem, i.e., for the given 
load level, we want to calculate the minimum load curtailment required to meet all 
constraints. 
d 
giPo^) = — Wi{PDT,imax ~ Po^i) (4.65) 
1=1 
For the minimum load curtailment problem, only 4.63 needs to be changed in the 
KKT equations as follows. 
^pkPdk + yZ ''^qkQdk + '^Di =0, i = 1, • • • ,d (4.66) 
keDi keDi 
where not = //(^ -
4.9 Illustration of Zone Based ML Algorithm on IEEE RTS'96 
Supppose the unit commitment pattern for the IEEE RTS'96 is as shown in Table 
4.4. When only line 6-10 is outaged, the program fails to converge if we assume that 
all loads change proportionally. Now we divide the system into 4 zones. 
• Zone 1 includes buses 11-24. It is mainly a generation provider. 
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Table 4.4 Unit commitment pattern for analysis 
II(in MW or MVar) 
Gen. bus p * gmax •Pgmin Qgrnax Qgmin 
14 0 0.00 200 -50 
15 155 54.25 80 -50 
16 155 54.25 80 -50 
18 400 100.00 200 -50 
21 400 100.00 200 -50 
22 250 0.00 80 -50 
23 660 248.50 310 -125 
• Zone 2 includes buses 1-5,9,10. It is mainly a load consumer. 
• Zone 3 includes buses 7,8. It is a heavy load center loosely connected with the 
system. 
• Zone 4 includes bus 6. Since the shunt reactor is not removed after line 6-10's 
outage, bus 6's load is expected to suffer low voltage. 
After the division, we use our program to calculate the maximum loadability by 
setting Wi = — . = 1 for all z = 1, • • • , 4. The calculation result is shown in Table 
4.5. 
Zone 2 and zone 3 has negative load, which is not reasonable. When ly = [1,10,10,20], 
zone 1-4 have loads [856.1, 744.6, 104.9, 4.1]MW respectively, the total load becomes 
1709.7 MW. 
Table 4.5 The maximum loadability under the unit 
commitment of Table 4.4 
zone 1 zone 2 zone 3 zone 4 total 
PDU{MW) 2097.3 -90.5 -19.3 15.4 1998.4 
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Now suppose the required total load level is 1797.4 MW. Assigning the load propor­
tionally to each zone we get Posmox = [957.3,567.6,186.7,85.8] MW. Set it; = [1,1,1,1] 
and solve the minimum load curtailment problem, we get Pjrjs = [957.3,219.3,132.9,0] 
MW. The total load is 1309.5 MW. Zone I's load has no curtailment, and zone 4 has 
no load. It means we must remove the shunt reactor simultaneously when the ca­
ble 6-10 is outaged; otherwise bus 6 will suffer low voltage. If we do this, PD-Z = 
[957.3,567.6,149.6,42.2] MW. The total load now becomes 1716.6 MW, which is 407.1 
MW more than when we did not remove the shunt reactor. 
Previously, we introduced the meaning of shadow prices. Now tt© has the same 
meaning. For example, for the unit commitment in Table 4.4, we have 
ttd = [-0.9294,0, -0.0002,4.1260] 
Since TTDI < 0 and is large in magnitude, we expect PDI:I to hit the upper limit 957.3 
MW. Since TTDA > 0 and is large in magnitude, we expect Ppzi to hit the lower limit 
0. These are confirmed by our calculation. For example, if we raise Pozimax by 500 
MW to 1767.8 MW. POT = [1457.3,204.2,106.3,0.1] MW, and the total load becomes 
1767.8 MW, 458.3 MW more than the original one. However, if we raise Po^imax to 
be 500 MW more, then the total load is 1390.5 MW, almost unchanged compared with 
the original result. This illustrates that the shadow prices tell us which limits are more 
important than others. 
Now we can explain the meaning of npk when k ^Qp, and the meaning of Tr,^ when 
k ^ Qq. They are the shadow prices of Pp,^ and the constant parts of load. It means 
when TTpik < 0, decreasing P^^ will increase the maximum loadability; when npk > 0, 
increasing P^^ increase the maximum loadability. The same comment is applied to 
Ttqk and Q5)*-
This time we change our unit commitment pattern to be as shown in Table 4.6. 
Assume the total required load is 0.95 times total generation, and eissign loads propor­
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tionally in zones, that is Pojimax = [1571.1,931.5,306.4,140.8] MW. Our calculation 
result is = [1571.1,931.5,285.0,140.7] MW. The total load curtailment is 21.4 MW. 
Suppose there are tie lines connected between buses 6,7,8,13,23 and the outer power 
systems respectively. Table 4.7 shows the shadow prices for tie lines. 
Table 4.6 Unit commitment pattern for analysis 
III (in MW or MVAR) 
Gen. bus Pjmax Pgmin Qgmax Qgmin 
1 192 62.00 80 -50 
2 192 62.00 80 -50 
13 591 206.85 240 0 
14 0 0.00 200 -50 
15 215 66.25 110 -50 
16 155 54.25 80 -50 
18 400 400.00 200 -50 
21 400 400.00 200 -50 
22 300 0.00 96 -60 
23 660 248.50 310 -125 
Table 4.7 Shadow prices for tie 
line flows 
Tie line bus TTp TT, 
6 -0.0816 -0.1589 
7 -0.9846 -1.4436 
8 -0.5999 -0.9711 
13 -0.0036 -0.0004 
23 -0.0003 0.0001 
If the price for MW or Mvar input at each tie line bus is the same, we should 
buy reactive power from the tie line at bus 7, because it is the most valuable power 
(shadow price -1.4436, the negative sign means increasing the input tie line flow will 
increase the ML). Now decrease Q% by 10 MVar and recalculate. We get Pos = 
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[1571.1,931.5,299.1,140.7] MW, the total load curtailment is 7.3 MW, 14.1 MW less 
than the oringinal case. However, if we buy active power 10 MW from bus 23's tie line, 
PD^ = [1571.1,931.5,285.0,140.7] MW, the total load curtailment is 21.4 MW, almost 
unchanged compared with the oringinal one. 
4.10 Expansion of Our Algorithm to ATC Calculation 
Our algorithm can also be applied to available transfer capability (ATC) calculation 
from the power flow feasibility point of view, either including or excluding thermal 
constraints. This application is not directly employed in our power flow infeasibility risk 
assessment, because in our risk assessment case only maximum loadability should be 
identified for each zone in every hour. This section is written here to show the power of 
our algorithm and for the purpose of completeness. 
Suppose now the system is running at the typical case described in reference [60], 
what is the maximum load the system can provide if only bus 13 and bus 23 are allowed 
to increase generation? Here we assume bus 13 and bus 23 belong to the same generation 
company. 
The problem can be explained in this way. 
1. The whole system is a zone. 
2. Pgk, Vgk are fixed for generation buses except buses 13 and 23. 
3. Qgk are allowed to adjust within ranges. 
Now we can use our zone-based maximum loadability subroutine to calculate. The 
TTC (total transfer capability) at bus 8 is 418.6 MW. Subtracting the base case power 
flow solution 171 MW at bus 8, the ATC (available transfer capability) is 247.6 MW. 
However, in order to afford this power, Pgiz = 585.7 MW, Pg23 = 541.0 MW, subtracting 
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the base case solution where Pgiz = 186.7 MW, Pg23 = 660 MW, we get the generation 
company has to increase 280 MW in order to provide the ATC 247.6 MW at bus 8. This 
is 32.4 MW more than the ATC power. This extra 32.4 MW is used to balance the extra 
transmission loss imposed by the increased power transfer. 
However, here thermal overload constraints are ignored. If we want to include the 
thermal overload constraints at each line, what shall we do? We should include the 
thermal overload constraints into the optimization problem 4.53, as follows. 
Define 
fi = - 2Viyi.cos{di^ - 0,,), Z = 1, • • • , L (4.67) 
where L is the number of Unes, li and Ij are the bus numbers of line /'s two buses. 
Suppose line Z's admittance is yt = gi+jbi, and its thermal overload current rating is //, 
then 
^ iff? 
/2 
Define rimax = a !#,;• The optimization problem can be generalized as sr+0, 
min g{z,y) (4.69) 
subject to 
h { z ,  y )  =  0  (4.70) 
z i < z < z u  ( 4 . 7 2 )  
where g { z ,  y )  is the objective function of ATC. 2 includes bounded variables such as 
Qg and V, while y includes unbounded variables 6. By adding barrier items, building La­
grange function and applying KKT first order conditions, we can simplify the equations 
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to be as follows (see [61] for details). 
^ dPei ^ dQei ^ dfi _ 
^ ^P' 90^ + ddk ^ *•' ddk /=i  " 1 = 1  "  i = \  "  
k e Q e  (4.73) 
^ dPel ^ dQel ^ 5// 
+ + - 0, 
1=1 " i=l * /=1 
A: € fiv (4.74) 
Pgk — Pok ~ PdkPo^i ~ Pek = 0, 
f c  =  l , - - - , A ^  ( 4 . 7 5 )  
Qgk — Q%k ~ QdkPoT.i — Qek = 0) 
k  =  l , - - - , N  (4.76) 
-Qp^ . + TTpfcPdA: + ^ 7r,fc9dA: = 0, 
*6Di fceD. 
i  =  l , - - - , d  (4.77) 
/i - n = 0, 
/ = (4.78) 
By using this model, we recalculate the ATC for the previous example. When the 
continuous ratings are applied to lines, the ATC becomes 393.6 MW, line 7-8 is con­
strained. When the long-term emergency ratings or short term emergency ratings are 
applied to lines, the ATC becomes 418.6 MW. No line is constrained. 
4.11 Factors That Influences the Algorithm's Speed and Con­
vergence 
According to our experience, /z adjustment scheme, initial point, and power flow 
equation multiplier are the three main factors that influences the algorithm's speed and 
convergnce. 
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Consider a simple optimization problem as follows. 
mina = (x + 1)^ + 2/^ (4.79) 
subject to 
0 < X < 1 
0 < y  < 1  
We know the optimal solution is {x',y*) = (0,0), and 2* = 1. The unconstrained 
optimal solution is (rr",j/") = (—1,0), 2" = 0. The alternative interior point problem is 
as follows. 
min2: = (x + 1)^ + — /iln(l — x) — /ilnx — /iln(l — y) — /ilny (4.80) 
subject to 
0 < X < 1 
0 < y < 1 
For the alternative problem, when /x = 1, the z-surface within the feasible region is 
shown in Figure 4.4; when n = 0.1, the z-surface within the feasible region is shown in 
Figure 4.5. From the two figures, we can see that when n is large, the z-surface is smooth, 
therefore we can easily get the optimal solution. When /z is small, the z-surface has a 
sharp fold near the boundary. When we come to a point just before this trench, since 
from the algorithm point of view, we do not recogonize the upcoming boundary wall 
at this point, and still head toward the unconstrained optimal solution (-1,0). Once we 
move, we immediately hit the boundary and have to stop somewhere before the boundary 
to keep feasibility. Maybe this time we are still before the trench, maybe after the trench. 
If we are after the trench, we recognize a steep fall and move back toward the trench. 
On the whole, we did not do much effort on traveling along the trench to the optimal 
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(0,0). Unless we find the exact bottom of the trench, we can not recognize the correct 
moving direction. Therefore, when /i is small, the algorithm is easy to get oscillation. 
For this example, when (x,p) = (0.05,0.35), the required moving direction is (-0.05,-
0.35). However, when (JL = 0.1, the calculated moving direction d = (—0.0049, —0.1861). 
When n = 0.0001, d — (-1.0284,-0.3497). Therefore, when fj. — 0.1, we can move 
toward the optimization easily, while when = 0.0001, we are expected to oscillate. 
z surface when 
X y 
Figure 4.4 z-surface when /x = 1 
Choosing the initial point in the interior rather than near the boundary and starting 
/i with a large value are the measures to avoid oscillation. Let us use the minimum load 
curtailment subroutine mentioned before as the example. We still use the typical case 
for IEEE RTS'96. Suppose we divide the system into 4 zones as mentioned previously. 
Suppose we start from the exact middle point for every variable with upper and lower 
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7. surface when )i=0.l 
X y 
Figure 4.5 z-surface when ^ = 0.1 
limits, and 0 for other variables. When we keep /z = 1.0, we spend 11 iterations to 
make equation errors less than 0.001, the calculated total load is 2447 MW. When we 
keep = 0.01, we spend 38 iterations, and the calculated total load is 2914 MW. The 
result is more accurate because it is larger. When fj. = 0.0001, the subroutine fails to 
converge after 100 iterations. Therefore, in our subroutine, starts from a large value, 
gets adjusted to a smaller value after each convergence, if oscillation is encountered, /j, 
is increased. 
Now we choose a = 0.999, and the initial value 
Pgk ~ Pjkmin "t" (^{Pgkmax Pgkmin): ^ ^ (^-^l) 
By using our subroutine, we spend 42 iterations to get the solution. Now change 
back to choosing a = 0.5. The number of iterations is reduced to 25. However, only 
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when the initial point is near the effective constraints will the algorithm oscillate. If at 
the first step, the point leaves the constraints and never come back, oscillation will not 
happen. For example, when we choose a = 0.1, the number of iterations is 23, even a 
bit better than a = 0.5. 
The better performance of a = 0.1 compared with a = 0.5 can be explained by 
Figure 4.6. The upper and lower limits on variables constitute a bounded space. Power 
flow equations constitute a hypercurve. The intersection of the bounded space and the 
hyperplance is the feasible region. When the initial point 1 (IPl) is near the upper 
bound, it heads toward the unconstrained optimal solution and hits the upper bound. 
However, the power flow equations are not balanced and the algorithm is prone to 
oscillation near the boudary. On the other hand, if we start from IP2, which is far 
away from the boundary, it will recognize the existence of the power flow hypercurve 
and merge into it somewhere before the boundary. Then it moves along the hypercurve 
until it hits the boundary. Since the solution now is feasible, further iterations are not 
needed. 
Another method is to multiply the power flow equations with a large multiplier c, 
say, 100. Then equation 4.75 and 4.76 become 
where A: = 1, • • • ,N .  
The solution has not been changed. However, since we emphasize the importance of 
power flow equations, we are expected to merge into the hypecurve faster, the number of 
iterations can then be reduced. The process is as shown in Figure 4.7. Table 4.8 shows 
different numbers of iterations under different values of c for the previous example by 
using our subroutine. It seems c=100 is an appropriate value. When c is too large, it 
moves slowly along the hypercurve, and the number of iterations will increase. 
C • {Pgk - Pok ~ PdkPoU - Pek) = 0, 
C • {Qgk QDk QdkPoEi Qek) — 0, 
(4.82) 
(4.83) 
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power flow 
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Figure 4.6 The influence of initial point position 
Bounded Space 
c=l 
power flow 
hypercurve 
c=100 
o 
Figure 4.7 The influence of power flow multiplier 
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Table 4.8 c .vs. number of 
iterations 
c 10 100 1000 10000 
iter 21 17 17 26 
Someone may suggest finding the exact trench bottom when a boundary is encoun­
tered to avoid oscillation. However, when two or more boudaries are encountered, finding 
the bottom of the trench will do little to help since the trench itself is bent. It will take 
many iterations to make a turn. Therefore, enlarging /i and adjusting the initial point 
are more reliable measures. 
4.12 Illustration of Annual Power Flow Infeasibility Risk As­
sessment 
We divide the IEEE RTS system into zones according to our experience, so that in 
each zone all loads vary proportionally. 
• Zone 1 includes bus 11-4. It is mainly a generation provider. 
• Zone 2 includes bus 16, 9, 10. It is mainly an electricity consumer.. 
• Zone 3 includes bus 7, 8. It is heavy load center connected loosely with the system. 
There are usually quite a few hours which have the same unit commitment. We pick 
up the peak load among these hours, denote it Psmax- Assuming the percentage load 
forecasting error is we choose 
P:u = (1 + 4(Tr)P,max (4.84) 
where P^u is the upper limit of the load level. Then we can apply our minimum load 
curtailment subroutine to calculate the load unbalance and the corresponding risk. We 
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use the term "load unbalance" instead of "load curtailment" because there are many 
ways to compensate for load unbalasce. We can buy power from neighbour systems, we 
can start up emergency units, or we can curtail load. Load curtailment is normally the 
last means and rarely happens. Therefore, the concept of load unbalance is broader and 
more appropriate than load curtailment. 
In our program, we assume the risk corresponding to one MWh load unbalance is 
$100. We also make use of shadow prices to discern load unbalance due to different 
reasons. We use the following scheme to discern different types of load unbalance. 
1. If TTai < —0.5 for all i, set type =0, the system has no load unbalance. 
2. Otherwise, if all -Kpk are negative and large in magnitude when k € fip, set type=l, 
the system is confined by active generation capacity. 
3. Otherwise, find the bus with the lowest voltage, denote it as bus m. 
4. If Ttym is small in magnitude, set type=2, the system is confined by voltage insta­
bility; otherwise, set type=3, the system is confined by voltage lower limit. 
The steps for annual load unbalance risk estimation are as follows. 
1. Combine hourly unit commitment patterns of the year. Reorder them from the 
highest total capacity to the lowest total capacity. 
2. For each unit commitment pattern, 
(a) Start from a flat start point, use interior poinnt algorithm to get the maximum 
loadability for the normal state, record maximum load levels and types for 
load unbalance. 
(b) For each contingency. 
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i. If this is the first unit commitment, start from the solution of the normal 
state. 
ii. Otherwise, look up the record. If in the history a flat start sign was set 
for this contingency, start from a flat start point;otherwise start from the 
normal state solution point. 
iii. If at this time, oscillation is encountered and a flat start process is called 
by our interior point subroutine, or if the number of iterations exceeds 
30, set the flat start sign. The following unit commitment patterns will 
begin from a flat start point for this contingency. 
iv. Record maximum load levels and types of load unbalance. 
(c) Calculate load unbalance risk and probability for different zones and different 
types for hours which have this unit commitment pattern, add them into 
annual risk assessment records. 
3. Output Calculation results. 
First we choose Vgmax = l.lOpit, Vgmin = O.QOpu, Vimax = 1.15pu, Vimin = 0.85pu. 
Here Vgmax ^ Vgmin are the generation bus voltage upper limit and lower limit respectively. 
V/mai) Vimin are the load bus voltage upper limit and lower limit respectively. The total 
load unbalance risk curve is shown in Figure 4.8. The load unbalance risk in three 
different zones are shown in Figures 4.9, 4.10, 4.11 respectively. The load unbalance risks 
due to different reasons are shown in Figure 4.12, 4.13, 4.14 respectively. Comparison 
of one figure to another should be done keeping in mind the different scales used on the 
vertical axis. From these figures we make the following observations. 
• Most of the total load unbalance risk is focused on the first half of the year. 
• Zone 3 is the weakest part of the system. It suffers the largest risk. Zone 1, which 
is mainly a generation provider, suffiers very little risk. 
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• Zone 3 suffers most of its risk in the first half year. Zone 2 suffers most of its risk 
at the end of the year. Zone 1 suffers most of its risk from the 5000th hour to the 
7000th hour, about from the beginning of July to the end of September. 
• Most of the risk is due to active generation constraint. The risk due to voltage 
lower limit is also significant. There is also some risk caused by voltage instability. 
Total load unbalance risk 
80001 1 I 1 1 1 I r 
Time (hour) 
Figure 4.8 Load unbalance risk over a year 
Table 4.9 shows the risk in different zones and due to different contingencies. Only 
the contingencies with risk greater than $10,000 are listed. From the table, we have the 
following observations. 
• The normal state contributes most of the risk. It means our unit commitment 
arrangement may have some drawbacks. 
• Loss of a line normally has less contribution to the total risk than loss of a unit. 
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Figure 4.9 Zone 1 risk over a year 
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Figure 4.10 Zone 2 risk over a year 
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Figure 4.11 Zone 3 risk over a year 
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Figure 4.12 Load unbalance risk due to generation limit 
70 
Load unbalance risk due lo voltage Instability 
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Figure 4.13 Load unbalance risk due to voltage instability 
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Figure 4.14 Load unbalance risk due to voltage lower limit 
• Common mode outages are not on the list. It is due to their low probabilities. 
• Nuclear units (unit 23 and unit 24) have high risk. 
Therefore, if we want to reduce risk, we can either adjust the unit commitment or 
upgrade the reliability of nuclear plants. We think the former is more effective. 
Table 4.9 Load unbalance risk in different zones ($) 
State Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Total 
Normal 0.65 4981 5513771 5518753 
Line 3-24 0.00 29.02 15926 15955 
Line 7- 8 0.00 6.84 12870 12877 
Line 8-10 0.00 1.16 12465 12466 
Line 9-11 0.00 9.15 10590 10599 
Line 9-12 0.00 10.11 10659 10669 
Line 10-11 0.00 11.77 11525 11537 
Line 10-12 0.00 14.54 11855 11870 
Unit 3 0.00 203.5 11983 12186 
Unit 4 0.00 203.5 11983 12186 
Unit 7 0.00 204.0 11316 11520 
Unit 8 0.00 204.0 11316 11520 
Unit 12 0.04 5909 48507 54415 
Unit 13 0.04 5909 48507 54415 
Unit 14 0.04 5909 48507 54415 
Unit 21 4.03 2521 48460 50986 
Unit 22 2.95 2509 43483 45995 
Unit 23 89.04 20713 84376 105178 
Unit 24 49.58 21912 84575 106537 
Unit 31 0.08 2273 50532 52805 
Unit 32 0.08 2273 50532 52805 
Unit 33 264.94 18673 66150 85088 
Total 458.46 96382 6390746 6487586 
Table 4.10 gives the expected load unbalance hours for each zone. From this table, 
we can also see zone 3 suffers load unbalance very seriously. 
Table 4.11 and 4.12 provides the risk due to different constraints and the expected 
load unbalance hours due to different constraints respectively. From these tables we 
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Table 4.10 Expected load unbal­
ance hours in different 
zones 
State Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 
Total 0.11 15.64 1839.56 
can see that generation inadequacy is the major problem of this system. Therefore, 
increasing the generation in zone 3 may reduce the risk. Figure 4.15 shows zone 3's 
generation capacity over one year. It seems the lack of generation capacity in zone 3 
during the first half of the year is the major reason for high risk. Table 4.13 shows the 
buses that hit their lower voltage limit and the expected number of hours for these buses 
to suffer low voltage. Only bus 6 and bus 7 suffer the lowest voltage. 
Table 4.11 Load unbalance risk due to different con­
straints ($) 
State P gmax Voltage 
instability 
Voltage 
lower limit 
Total 
Total 6456985 4494 26107 6487586 
Table 4.12 Expected load unbalance hours due to dif­
ferent constraints (hours) 
State p •« gmax Voltage 
instability 
Voltage 
lower limit 
Total 
Total 1846.29 0.82 5.63 1852.74 
74 
Zone 3 Generation Capacity 
300r 
250 
200 
I 
|.»h 
m u 
T~i r 
(3 
iro • 
so' 
1000 2000 3000 4000 SOOO 
T (hour) 
6000 7000 8000 9000 
Figure 4.15 Zone 3 capacity over one year 
Table 4.13 Low voltage bus and expected 
low voltage hours 
bus no. voltage insta­
bility hours 
voltage lower 
limit hours 
6 0.00 1.43 
7 0.82 4.20 
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4.13 Summary of this Chapter 
Power flow infeasibility risk is the risk suflfered when the pov/er flow is infeasible. It 
can be caused either by generation constraints, or by voltage instability, or by voltage 
lower limit constraints. A new interior point algorithm is proposed to calculate power 
flow infeasibility risk due to load unbalance, and shadow prices are employed to identify 
the reason for power flow infeasibility. This method is then expanded to deal with 
multi-zones. The multi-zone model is then adopted for every hour and every outage to 
accumulate risk over a year. It is also shown that our proposed method can even be 
used to calculate ATC. The risk assessment results for IEEE RTS'96 are shown to be 
decomposable and informative. 
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CHAPTER 5 THERMAL OVERLOAD RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
Many researchers have developed probabilistic techniques for assessing power system 
overload security. For example, Billinton [12] proposed enumerating contingency states 
for a specific loading condition, investigating the overload security of each state, and 
combining the corresponding probabilities of the violated states. However, several other 
researchers account for load uncertainty. Their research resulted in the probabilistic load 
flow (PLF) [62]. Early in 1973, the concept of probabilistic load flow was first proposed 
by Borkowska [63]. In that paper, DC power flow and convolution techniques of random 
variables were employed to calculate probabilistic power flow. In 1975, O.A. Klitin from 
American Electric Power (AEP) proposed a completely diflferent method (widely known 
as the AEP method) independently [64]. The concept of stochastic load flow proposed 
by him was based on Gaussian distributed random variables, while the probabilistic load 
flow has no assumptions on the distributions of those random variables. Further devel­
opment of the probabilistic power flow included FFT based discrete convolution method 
to facilitate convolution calculation [65]; a multilinearisation technique to linearize the 
power system at several points instead of one point to overcome the nonlinearity of power 
flow equations [66]; a method to calculate probabilistic load flow when dependences be­
tween loads are considered [67]; and an application of the least square method with 
the number of unknown variables greater than the number of equations in probabilistic 
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power flow calculation [62]. F\irther development of the stochastic power flow included a 
method to represent non-Gaussian probability distributions by the method of Gaussian 
sum approximations [68], and an optimal stochastic load flow model [69]. There are also 
other methods to solve the probabilistic power flow problem, such as Ihe Monte Carlo 
simulation [70] and the probabilistic collocation method [7i]. 
The PLF method is mainly proposed for probabilistic analysis of operating condi­
tions. In addition, efforts have been made to perform risk assessment for power system 
planning in [72]. Paper [72] uses the daily load curve (its basic time unit is one day) 
to predict the future load and load uncertainty, then perform cost and benefit com­
parison among different system expansion plans based on PLF techniques. However, 
it does not perform sequential unit commitment and does not calculate risk hour by 
hour. In this dissertation, we apply the sequential mean-variance model to generate a 
system trajectory, as described in Chapter 3. Furthermore, our risk assessment result 
is decomposable and assignable according to different hours, different components and 
different contingencies. These two aspects make our thermal overload risk assessment 
unique relative to the work of other researchers. However, for the risk assessment of a 
specific hour, our method is similar to a typical PLF. We employ a convolution technique 
based on a linearized model to calculate overload probability, which is very similar to 
the method proposed in [63]. In order to facilitate our calculation, we propose a new 
method called segmentwise cluster based convolution method to deal with convolutions 
between random variables [73]. This provides an increase in computational speed suffi­
cient to allow the computation to be done hourly over a year's trajectory of operating 
conditions rather than for a single snapshot as was done in [63]. In addition, we include 
impact assessment through a "component risk table" to enable calculation of risk, which 
extends the probability calculation of [63]. We illustrate the risk assessment results on 
the IEEE RTS'96. 
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5.2 Some Assumptions 
5.2.1 Load Model 
We have assumed a standard deviation on total load as a percentage of the total load. 
We assume this solution also applies to each individual load as the same percentage of 
their expected values. Denote Pui to be the real part of the load at bus i. For different 
buses (when z ^ j), it is normally incorrect to assume that loads Poi and Poj are 
independent. Therefore, we assume there is a covariance matrix for the random load 
vector. This covariance matrix can be estimated by statistical methods. However, in our 
risk assessment for the IEEE RTS'96, since we lack real data to estimate the covariance 
matrix, for the purpose of illustration, we assume the correlations between loads within 
the same voltage level are all 0.5, while the correlations between loads of different voltage 
levels are all zero. Once we have the estimated covariance matrix from history data, we 
could easily substitute it into our software. 
5.2.2 Generation Model 
We assume every generation bus is an independent generation company. That means 
if a unit is outaged, other units at the same bus will increase power to make up for 
the generation loss. Only when the total capacity is below the required power at the 
operation state is there generation loss on this bus. Now we express this idea analytically. 
Suppose for bus i, the generation capacity at operation state is C7/(0), where 0 denotes 
no unit is outage, and the real generation at operation state is Pa- When one or more 
units at a bus fails, the bus is transfered from the normal state to some other state, say, 
state n. If we denote C,(n) to be the corresponding generation capacity at bus i and 
state n, then the generation inadequacy is 
-APaiin)  = {Pa -  Ci{n))u{PGi -  Ci{n))  (5.1) 
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where 
0, 2: < 0 
1, a; > 0 
and APGt(n) is defined as the increment of generation at bus i  and state n. 
5.2.3 Consideration of Reactive Power 
It is the current flowing through a line that causes the thermal overload problem. 
Therefore, not only active power influences the thermal overload, but also the reactive 
power. In order to enhance computational speed, we use approximate model to 
include this effect. Since the disturbances of the system are normally small, we assume 
that voltage at every bus remains constant before and after the contingency. Therefore, 
for small disturbances, the reactive power will remain constant for every line. However, 
there are two PQ pairs corresponding to two ends of a line respectively. We choose the 
one which makes the value + Q^/V larger, where all variables are in per unit. 
5.2.4 Consideration of Corrective Actions and Protection devices 
A thermal overload on a line can not be tolerated for a long time without taking 
corrective action. Here we assume all thermal overload can be alleviated within the time 
interval of 1 hour. This implies that the duration of overloads are considered to be one 
hour. 
5.3 Flow Distribution 
5.3.1 Linearization Around Operating Point 
We employ variable s  to identify the outage state, while we use state 1 to represent 
the normal state without outages. From the DC power flow formulation, we can obtain 
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the following expressions for branch flows corresponding to any outage state s  and the 
normal state 1. 
= A(sYB;^{Pa-PB) (5.2) 
P,(l) = A{.\fB;,'{Pa-PD) (5.3) 
where 
• PQ is the vector of real power generator levels at each bus. 
• PD is the vector of real power load levels at each bus. 
• Bp, is the B-matrix for outage state s .  
• i4(s) is the connection matrix of the network for outage state s, having rows 
corresponding to buses (excluding the swing bus) and columns corresponding to 
branches. 
•  Pi{s)  is the vector of branch power flows for outage state s .  
Subtracting equations 5.2 from 5.3 we get 
PI {s)  = PKl) + -  Xt{ l ) ] { P G  -  PD) (5.4) 
where Xj(s) = Since Xi{s)  are independent of generation and load level, we 
can calculate and store them beforehand to save computation time. 
If we set Pa and PD to be their expected values for the hour, and use a full AC 
power flow solution to obtain Pi{l), then equation 5.4 provides the expected flows for 
all branches at the hour assuming the system is in state s. We will use this below in 
obtaining the distribution of flows due to uncertainty in generation. 
Now we define APG and APQ as the vectors of random variables corresponding to 
generation and load levels, respectively. We describe each component of APQ with a 
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two state probability mass function. We describe each element of APD with a normal 
distribution having a mean equal to 0 and a standard deviation derived from our load 
model assumption. That means the standard deviation of APD is the same as the 
standard deviation of load which is obtained from the load forecasting error as 
described in Section 2, Chapter 3. The vector of random variables corresponding to 
variations in branch flows at outage state s are then given as 
APL{S) = XI{S)IAPG -  APD) (5.5) 
and the vector of random variables corresponding to the branch flows 
PUs) = Pi{s)  + APUs) (5.6) 
Substitution of equation 5.5 into 5.6 yields 
PL{S) = {PI{S) + XT{S)APG)-XIIS)APD 
= Plg(s) + P^zp(S) (5.7) 
Here PLG{S) is the vector of random variables corresponding to branch flows due to 
variation in generation, given by 
PLG{S)^PI{S)^XI{S)APG (5.8) 
Also, PLD{S) is the vector of random variables corresponding to branch flows due to 
variations in loads, given by 
PLD{S) = -XI(S)APD (5.9) 
5.3.2 Obtaining the distribution of PLG{S) and PLD{S) 
Because the product term in equations 5.8 represent vector multiplications, they 
involve summations of random variables, and therefore the distributions of APLG{S) can 
be obtained by convolution of the component distributions. The convolution algorithm 
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we use was developed explicitly for this purpose, and it is quite efficient. It is fully 
described in Section 5.4. 
We know that if a vector of random variable V is given by 
V = AZ 
where is a constant matrix and Z is a vector of random variables, then 
E(V) = AE(Z) 
cov(V) = Acov(Z)A^ 
By assumption, the vector of load variations APo are normally distributed and they 
have 0 means. We also assume that the covariance matrix for APo is available, as we 
explained in subsection 5.2.1. Therefore, from equation 5.9, the covariance matrix for 
PLD{S) can be easily obtained from 
COV {Pid{S ) )  = XI{S)COV {APD)X'[  {S) (5.10) 
The diagonal elements of equation 5.10 are the line flow variances, which completely 
describe the zero mean distr ibutions for  each element in PLD{S)-
5.4 Segmentwise Cluster Based Convolution Method 
5.4.1 Segmentwise Cluster Based Random Variable Description 
A discrete random variable can be easily represented by two vectors: one is for 
possible values and the other is for probabilities at those values. However, this kind of 
representation has some drawbacks. The number of possible states for the summation of 
random variables grows exponentially fast with the number of random variables. Some 
states may be relatively close in term of their values so that combining them as a single 
state results in little loss in accuracy but significant gain in computation speed. This 
83 
is conceptually appealing, yet a practical problem remains: how to select the value and 
probability of the combined state? 
Segmentwise convolution is one possible solution which has been proposed and used 
before. From the lowest value of the variable to the highest value, we can use a grid to 
divide possible states and cluster states within an interval of the grid into one equiva­
lent state. For example, a random variable has possbile values (1,2,7), and probabilities 
(0.2,0.2,0.6). We can use a grid with start point 0, and interval gap 5 to divide states, 
i.e., we can define (0,5], (5,10] to be two cluster intervals. Then as 1,2 G (0,5], they 
should be combined into one state, and 7 is another state. However, previous implemen­
tations of the convolution algorithm uses the midpoint of each segment to represent the 
segment's value. This is not accurate because the values of the states within the segment 
interval may be far away from the midpoint. In our program, we adopt a cluster based 
description. For segment (0,5], the expected value is ^ = 1-5, the probability is 
0.2 -I- 0.2 = 0.4. Therefore, the value vector (1.5,7), and the probability vector (0.4,0.6) 
can be use to represent the random variable. We call those values which are used to 
represent segments representative values. 
In our program, we use a structure to represent a random variable, say X. The 
structure includes the smallest value (or the start value) of A' (denoted by StartX), the 
interval gap between segments (denoted by A), the sparse vector for representative incre­
mental values of all segments (denoted by dX), and the sparse vector for probabilities of 
all segments (denoted by probX). Here dX of a segment is defined as the representative 
value subtracted by the left hand side boundary limit of this segment. The structure is 
shown in the following pseudo code. 
Struct random_variable{ 
double StartX; 
double A; 
sparse-vector dX; 
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sparse-vector probX; 
}; 
Denote the representative value of the zth segment of X to be X{i) ,  then we can 
calculate X (i) from our data structure 
A:(i) = (z - 1) * A + dX(i) (5.11) 
Using this data structure, we can compile subroutines for convolution, deconvolution, 
and multiplication with a coeflficient. 
5.4.2 Convolution 
Given random variables X and Y,  what is the distribution of random variable Z = 
A" + y, if the two random variables are independent of each other? The calculation is 
defined as convolution. It can be expressed as Z = A'0y, where the sign © indicates that 
X and Y are independent. If X and Y are both represented in our standard structure, 
how do we design an algorithm to get Z with the same structure? Here A is the same 
for every random variable. Of course StartZ = StartX + StartY, and Z represented by 
our proposed structure can be obtained by convoluting all possible combinations of X's  
segments and K's segments. When the ith segment of X and the jth segment of Y is 
convoluted, the representive value of the corresponding segment in  Z is  z  = X{i)  + Y{j) ,  
where X{i) and Y{j) can be computed by 5.11. The corresponding segment number of 
z (denoted by k) is 
(5.12) 
The equation can be simplified as 
* = (5.13) 
For any combination of X{i)  and Y{j) ,  we can always find the appropriate index k 
of the interval to accommodate the value z  = X{i)  + Y{j)  by using 5.13. As long as k 
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and z  are known, we can use them to update previous Z{k)  and probZ{k) .  
_  probZ{k)Z{k)  + probX{i)probY{j)z  
probZ {k)  + probX {i)probY { j )  
probZ{k)  = probZ{k)  + probX{i)probY{j)  
(5.14) 
(5.15) 
The dZ{k)  can be obtained by 
dZ{k)  = Z{k)  — {k  — 1)A — startZ (5.16) 
Once all combinations are processed, the random variable Z has been established. 
5.4.3 Deconvolution 
Assume we know Z = X ®Y,  and Z and X are known, however, we do not know 
Y. Then how do we calculate Y from Z and X? This is just like an inverse calculation 
of convolution. It is called deconvolution. Can we just calculate Z 0 (—A') so that the 
convolution subroutine can be used? No, because Z and X are correlated. So how to find 
Y by deconvolution? Here we propose a recursive subtracting technique. It differs from 
other deconvolution algorithms in that it fully employs our proposed random variable 
structure. 
Denote the final element index for A', Y and Z as nx,ny,nz  respectively, where riy  is 
unknown now. Since we have X{nx) + Y{ny) = Z{nz), we have 
Y(ny)  = Z{n,)  -  X(n,)  (5.17) 
And we also have 
StartY = StartZ — StartX (5.18) 
From Y{ny) and StartY, the index riy can be easily determined. And 
probY{ n y )  =  probZ{nt)  
probX (r ix)  (5.19) 
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Once we get the final element of Y,  we can eliminate its contribution, i.e., for every 
possible value o{ z  = X{i)  + Y{ny)^  we can find the appropriate index k for z  by applying 
5.13, and then update previous Z{k)  and probZ{k)  by 
_ Z{k)probZ{k)  -  z • probX { i )probY { n y )  
probZ{k)  — probX { i )probY { n y )  
probZ{k)  = probZ{k)  — probX ( i )probY { n y )  (5-21) 
After adjustment, the final element of Y is eliminated. Then we can use the same 
procedure to calculate the second largest state of Y. We can repeat this procedure until 
we obtain all elements of Y. The flowchart of the algorithm is shown in Figure 5.1. 
/  \ N o  
Z empty? 
Yes 
End 
Start 
Find the final element of Z 
StartY=StartZ-StartX 
Find the fmal element of X 
Use equations (S.17) and (5.19) to 
Calculate the final unknown element of 
Y, fill it to the right segment. 
Jse equations (5.20) and (5.21) to adjus 
all Z elements. 
Figure 5.1 Deconvolution subroutine flowchart 
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5.4.4 Multiplication with A Coefficient 
This subroutine is used to calculate Z = c-X, where c is a real number, X is a randum 
variable represented by our proposed random variable structure. In our program, we 
choose 5 MW as the segment width. Therefore, for every X{i), we calculate cX{i), then 
find an appropriate index k to place it by applying the expression 
rcX(i)  — s tartZ,  
r \ 1 (5.22) 
We choose the starting base StartZ to be the largest multiple of the segment width 
which is less than the smallest possible cX value. 
5.5 Obtaining the Distribution of PLG{S) 
Based on the segmentwise cluster based convolution method, we can calculate the 
probabilistic distribution of PLG{S) easily. From equation 5.8, since Xi{s) is a constant 
matrix, and APc is a random vector, we can apply the multiplication and convolution 
subroutines directly to get the distribution of PLG{S). Here APg is calculated from 
equation 5.1. According to equation 5.1, bus Vs APa is a function of the generation 
capacity Cj. Since Ci is a random variable with multiple states, APci is also a random 
variable with multiple states. Its magnitude with respect to each state can be obtained 
from equation 5.1; its probability with respect to each state is the summation of the 
probabihties of all possible C, 's that result in APA-
The probability mass function of Ci can also be calculated by our convolution al­
gorithm. At bus i, if the number of operational generators is n^, then the Capacity at 
generation bus i is 
"i 
= (5-23) 
i=i 
where Cij is the capacity of generator j  at bus i .  Every Cij is a two state random 
variable, with the probability (1-FOR) at the full generation, and the probability FOR at 
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0. Therefore, Ci is the convolution result of all C^ 's at bus i .  We can use our convolution 
algorithm to calculate the distribution of the random vector C = [Ci, C2, • • • Civ^]^ from 
scratch, where Ng is the number of generation buses. 
However, the unit commitment does not change very often, and when it does, not 
by very much. Therefore, constructing random vector C for each hour will waste a large 
amount of time. Therefore, we only construct C the first hour. After that, we check if 
the unit commitment is different from the previous time, if it is not, we do not have to 
change C. Otherwise, we compare unit states for every unit, and if the unit is started 
up currently, we apply the convolution algorithm to update Ci at the corresponding bus 
1. If the unit is shut down, we use the deconvolution subroutine to update Ci at the 
corresponding bus i .  
5.6 Screening Technique 
In summing up the possible states for a line, we may ignore the very low probability 
states. For line i under state s, we denote the line flow PuisYs mean and standard 
deviation to be p(s, i) and a{s, i) respectively. We further define p(s, i) as the number 
of standard deviations from the mean for the flow Pu{s) on line i under state s to the 
upper limit Pz,,m«(s) when the overload risk becomes obvious, given by 
Pis,  i )  = (5.24) 
a{s, i )  
If the line flow Puis)  is normally distributed, when p{s, i )  > 4.0, Prob{PLimiis)  > 
p(s,z)) < 0.000033. Even if we consider the influence of generators which makes the 
distribution deviate from normal, such a small probability can be ignored. The screening 
condition that only those cases with p(s, i) < 4 are considered saves a large amount of 
calculation time. Use of this technique together with our segmentwise cluster based 
convolution method leads to the final realization of our program that can calculate 
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thermal overloeid risk using such a thorough model within a reasonable computation 
time. 
5.7 Risk Calculation 
Having determined the probabilistic distributions of the flows through lines and trans­
formers, we can combine these probabilistic distributions with component thermal over­
load "risk curves" to perform system-wide cumulative thermal overload risk assessment. 
These curves are computed and stored in advance of the trajectory-based cumulative 
risk calculation. They provide the expected impact given the flow for all possible flows 
and all circuits. 
5.7.1 Component Risk 
Let us denote the flow distribution of line i  under state s  as f i{Pii\s )  for the random 
flow Puis) on circuit i. Then we may obtain the total risk for the hour, for the given 
circuit i, and for the given system state s, as 
RiskiiPiiis)) = f fi{Pii\s)Riski{lTni\Pii)dPu (5.25) 
J —00 
Here, the term i2isfc,(/7n,|P/i) is the component risk for circuit i .  It provides the 
risk, given the flow for the next hour, under the uncertainty of the impact of this flow 
on this circuit (denoted by /m,). 
5.7.1.1 Component Risk for Lines 
When the circuit is a transmission line, the impact depends on the conductor tem­
perature 6i, and the component risk is cmputed as 
/
OO 
Pr{9i\Ii){Im,agi9i) + lTnannealing{Oi)}ddi (5.26) 
-oo 
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where /, is the conductor current corresponding to the flow PU. The function PR{9I\II)  
provides the distribution of the conductor temperature under the uncertainty of am­
bient temperature and the component of wind speed normal to the conductor. The 
term Imaagi^i) is the economic impact of conductor clearance loss due to sag. The 
term Irrianneaiing is the economic impact of conductor strength loss due to annealing. 
Development and use of equation 5.26 is from [74]. 
Use of equation 5.26 requires that the distribution Pr{6i\Ii), which depends on the 
ambient temperature and wind speed, match the season and time of day for which 
they are used. We generally recommend using at least eight distributions; one pair for 
each of the four seasons such that each pair consists of a day time and a night time 
distribution. Of course, one may use as many distributions as are necessary for the 
particular application. 
5.7.1.2 Component Risk for Transformers 
When the circuit is a transformer, the impact depends on the hottest-spot tempera­
ture (HST) of oil. Under a specified operating condition X (typically characterized by 
transformer loading in terms of current), the risk of a period of T is defined as 
Risk{X) = Riski{X)  + Risk2{X) (5.27) 
where Risk\{X)  corresponds to loss of life: 
Riski{X)  = f  [  Pr{d\X)  x Imioaauaf j i fedddt  (5.28) 
J Q J Oq 
and Risk2{X) corresponds to transformer dielectric failure; 
RISK2{X) = f  f  PT{6\X) X H{ t \D) x IMFAIIURED9DT (5.29) 
Jo  JOQ 
Here Pr{d\X)  is the probability density function of the HST 9 under the condition X; 
H{t\9)  is the hazard function of the transformer dielectric failure given 9 at time t \  
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ImiossuofJife is the impact cost of the transformer's loss of life; Imjaiiure is the impact 
cost of the transformer's dielectric failure [75]. 
Use of equations 5.28 and 5.29 requires the distribution of PT{9\X),  which depends 
on the ambient temperature. In order to keep consistency, we use the same ambient 
temperature model here as the model used in the line risk calculation. 
5.7.2 Risk Curves 
Use of equation 5.26 and 5.27 is computationally expensive, and therefore they are 
done in separate procedures before the risk calculation. This procedure results in a set 
of "risk curves", one for each circuit, such as that shown in Figure 5.2. This makes 
solving equation 5.25 much more efficient. 
Ttiermal oveiload risk ot a line vs. cu rent curve 
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Figure 5.2 The thermal overload risk vs. line current curve 
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When the distribution of ambient temparature and the average wind speed are given, 
[74] has already shown the curve of thermal overload risk vs. line flow current can be 
drawn. According to [74], when the probabilistic distributions of the ambient tempera­
ture and the wind speed are chosen to be typical, the thermal overload risk curves for 
a typical 230 KV line and a typical 138 KV line are shown in Figure 5.2. Here risk is 
in pu value. One pu risk equals the money required to reconductor the whole line. We 
choose it to be $108,000/mile for a 230 KV line, and $666,667/mile for a 138 KV line 
according to [11]. 
Similarly, thermal overload of a transformer could result in aging of materials such 
as paper and oil [75]. Under the same typical probabilistic distribution of ambient 
temperature, according to [75], the thermal overload risk vs. load curve for a typcial 
transformer is shown in Figure 5.3. Here risk is also expressed in pu value. One pu risk 
equals the money required to rebuild the transformer. We choose it to be $1,000,000. 
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Figure 5.3 The thermal overload risk vs. transformer load curve 
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5.8 Flowchart of Annual Thermal Overload Risk Assessment 
In summary, the flowchart of the annual thermal overload risk assessment module is 
shown in Figure 5.4. 
5.9 Analysis of Calculation Results 
For the IEEE RTS'96, the thermal overload risk during a whole year is shown in 
Figure 5.5. From the figure we can see the 1798th hour has a peak risk which is much 
higher than other hours. Figure 3.1 shows the peak risk hour is not at peak load at 
•"^itluiiui ail credible coniintcncicT^ 
Line risk vs. 
currcnt uble 
Pick up hour i 
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Load 
Transformer risk 
vs. current table 
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For each credible contingency 
Calculate the contnbuuon of geoerauon on line flows 
Include load uncertainty, calculate thermal ovoload risk 
for every line 
If laat. form the generauon random vanables; otherwise, change the 
random vanables by convolution and doconvolution method. 
Figure 5.4 The flowchart for thermal overload risk assessment 
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all. The risk curve of the day including the peak risk hour is shown in Figure 5.6. The 
corresponding load profile within the same period is shown in Figure 5.7. It is shown 
in Figure 5.6 that the load decreases a little from hour 1797 to 1798. We checked the 
unit commitment and found that this little decrement triggers 2 generation units with 
capacity 197 MW each at bus 13 to be shut down. However, at this time the load is 
not small enough. This results in long distance power transfer, and causes high thermal 
overload risk ultimately. If we use snapshot models to represent system trajectory, we 
are unlikely to capture such a partial peak risk. 
There is a period which has almost no risk between hour 5401 and hour 6668. This is 
because during this time period, generation is distributed more evenly so that customers 
do not have to require power transfer from a long distance. 
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Figure 5.5 Hourly thermal overload risk over a year 
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Figure 5.6 Risk curve of the day with the peak risk hour 
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Figure 5.7 Load profile of the day with the peak risk hour 
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The annual risk suffered by severe lines is listed in Table 5.1. All other lines have 
less than $1 risk. 
There are 46 network states, including normal state, one-line outages, common mode 
outages. The states which suffer high risk are listed in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.1 The annual 
risk suffered 
by severe 
lines 
Severe line Risk ($) 
11-13 145 
14-16 2333 
15-16 979 
16-17 2796207 
16-19 1300 
17-18 139006 
Table 5.2 The annual risk for 
different outages 
Outage Risk ($) 
Line 14-16 1300 
Line 15-16 217 
Line 16-19 979 
Line 17-18 2333 
Common mode B 145 
Common mode D 2934996 
The total annual risk is $2,939,971. We can see from Table 5.1 that line 16-17 and line 
17-18 suffer severe risk. The owner of these two lines should receive some compensation 
for their high risk. We can also see from Table 5.2 that common mode D contributes 
the most to the annual risk. Therefore, if we can build the double lines from bus 15-21 
on separated towers, the risk will be significantly reduced. 
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Figure 5.5 shows risk distribution among hours. Table 5.1 shows decomposition of 
risk suffered by different components. Table 5.2 shows decomposition of risk caused 
by different components. Figure 5.5, Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 shows the essence of 
decomposable and assignable risk assessment. 
5.10 Summary of This Chapter 
When the whole year's system trajectory is identified, the annual thermal overload 
risk assessment is just the cumulation of risk over all hours. For every hour, the thermal 
overload risk assessment is in essence a probabilistic power flow problem and can be 
solved by a probabilistic power flow algorithm. The fundamental idea of the method 
proposed in [63] is borrowed to design our own thermal overload risk assessment algo­
rithm. The power system is first linearized around operating point, then decomposed 
into two parts. The distribution of the part which is the linear combination of loads can 
be computed directly by employing Gaussian distribution properties. The distribution 
of the part which is the linear combination of generations can be computed by convo­
lution methods. In order to facilitate our calculation, we develop a new convolution 
method called segmentwise cluster based convolution method. Annual thermal overload 
risk assessment performed on the IEEE RTS'96 shows that our proposed method can 
specify when and where a power system is going to suffer severe risk, and who causes 
the risk. 
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CHAPTER 6 COMPOSITE CUMULATIVE RISK 
ASSESSMENT AND COST BENIFIT ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction 
Having designed methods to perform annual risk assessment for power system infea-
sibility and thermal overload, we can now identify and compare alternative unit com­
mitment scenarios and facility plans. The basic idea is to identify risk and cost as a 
single economic measure and then perform cost-benefit comparison between all alter­
native plans. The IEEE RTS'96 is used to illustrate this idea. There are many other 
decision making methods based on different ideas according to different preferences [76]. 
We choose a simple one only for an illustration purpose because the ma?.n thrust of this 
dissertation is on risk calculation rather than decision making. Future researchers will 
be able to combine this work with decision making theories. 
In the process of illustrating how our cumulative risk assessment aids decision mak­
ing, we will also observe that our risk assessment method offers the advantage of enabling 
composition or decomposition of risk. One may compose risk into a single system or 
regional index that is useful for comparing various alternative plans. One may also de­
compose risk to identify the particular causes of risk and those entities that are incurring 
the risk as well. 
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6.2 Composite Cumulative Risk Assessment 
The composite cumulative risk assessment can be obtained simply by adding cu­
mulative thermal overload risk and cumulative power flow infeasibility risk. Figure 6.1 
illustrates the hourly composite risk variation over a year. We can see that the first half 
year suffers severe risk, while the second half year is relatively secure. 
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Figure 6.1 Hourly composite risk variation over a year for the original plan 
The peak risk occurs at hour 1798, the same hour when the thermal overload risk 
also reaches its peak. The period from hour 5401 to hour 6668 still has little risk, very 
similar to the thermal overload risk. 
Table 6.1 illustrates how we may report risk associated with each outage state. All 
states with the risk greater than $10,000 are listed. From this table, first we notice 
the normal state suffers the largest part of the risk, $5,518,754. This implies that 
our unit commitment scenario may be inappropriate when transmission constraints are 
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considered. Second, common mode D outage causes the second largest risk, $2,935,657. 
If we build the two parallel lines from bus 15 to bus 21 on different towers, because of 
the very low probability of the concurrent two line outage contingency, this part of risk 
can be largely eliminated. Third, all transformer outages cause large risk. This shows 
the reliability importance of transformers in this system. Finally, the outages of both 
line 7-8 and line 8-10 cause large risk. This illustrates that the subarea constituted by 
buses 7, 8, 9 and 10 together with the lines between them is a weak area with high risk. 
Table 6.1 The annual composite 
risk contributed by dif­
ferent system states 
System State Risk ($) 
normal 5518754 
common mode D 2935657 
transformer 3-24 outage 15955 
line 7-8 outage 12877 
line 8-10 outage 12466 
transformer 10-12 outage 11870 
transformer 10-11 outage 11537 
transformer 9-12 outage 10669 
transformer 9-11 outage 10599 
The annual power flow infeasibility risk is $6,487,586. The annual thermal overload 
risk is $2,939,971. The annual composite risk is $9,427,557. The composition of risk is 
shown in Table 6.2. In this table, we use PFI to represent Power Flow Infeasibility, TO 
to represent Thermal overload. We also use 
• Type 1 to represent the PFI risk due to generation inadequacy. 
• Type 2 to represent the PFI risk due to voltage instability. 
• Type 3 to represent the PFI risk due to voltage exceeding lower limit. 
These acronyms will be used throughout this chapter. 
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Table 6.2 The composition of risk for the original plan ($) 
PFI Risk TO Risk Total Risk Decomposition Total 
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 
6487586 2939971 9427557 458 96382 6390746 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
6456985 4494 26107 
6.3 Alternative Plan I-Loosening the Acceptable Load Voltage 
Limits 
Originally we set the load voltage limit VJmm = 0-85, Vimax = 115, this may cause 
power flow infeasibility risk when a load bus's voltage reaches the lower bound and can 
not be lower. If we loosen the load voltage limit to be = 0.80, Vimax = 1-20, the 
composition of risk is shown in Table 6.3, the hourly composite risk variation over a year 
is shown in Figure 6.2. 
Table 6.3 The composition of risk for Alternative Plan I ($) 
PFI Risk TO Risk Total Risk Decomposition Total 
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 
6483226 2939971 9423197 
458 96135 6386633 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
6457926 4418 20882 
As expected, the power flow infeasibility risk due to voltage lower limit reduces 
from $26107 to $20882. However, the total power flow infeasibility risk only drops 
0.067%. The thermal overload risk will not be changed when voltage limits are changed. 
Therefore, lowering voltage limit has little effect on reducing the total risk. 
Intuitively, the voltage instability risk should not decrease when the voltage limits 
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Figure 6.2 Hourly composite risk variation over a year for Alternative Plan 
I 
are loosened. However, our calculation indicates that the voltage instability risk (type 
2 risk) reduces a little from $4494 to $4418. This may be because we use the "shadow 
price" of the lowest bus voltage (in pu value) to discriminate whether the risk is due to 
voltage instability (type 2) or voltage exceeding the lower limit (type 3), but other buses 
may be comfined by voltage limits as well. When the voltage limits of other buses are 
loosened, the type 2 risk may be reduced due to the larger space for optimization. 
6.4 Alternative Plan II-Tightening the Acceptable Load Volt­
age Limit 
If we tighten the load voltage limit to be Vimm = 0.90, Vij„ax = 110, the hourly 
composite risk variation over a year is shown in Figure 6.3, the composition of risk is 
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shown in Table 6.4. FVom this table, we can see the total risk increases, as expected. 
Although the voltage instability risk reduces significantly, it does not disappear. It 
means there exist some extreme cases which have very normal bus voltages, but suffer 
voltage stability problem. One must be careful to detect these cases in operations since 
they are not readily identified by voltage magnitudes. 
Composite Risk curve 
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Figure 6.3 Hourly composite risk variation over a year for Alternative Plan 
II 
6.5 Alternative Plan Ill-Modifying Unit Commitment 
Since the major power flow infeasibility risk is due to the generation constraint 
and zone 3 suffers most of the risk, it is natural for us to constrain on all available 
units in Zone 3 (which consist only of bus 7) all the time except when they are under 
maintenance. Under such a scenario, the composition of risk is shown in Table 6.5. The 
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Table 6.4 The composition of risk for Alternative Plan II ($) 
PFI Risk TO Risk Total Risk Decomposition Total 
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 
6516779 2939971 9456750 528 96104 6420147 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
6462457 421 53901 
hourly composite risk variation over a year is shown in Figure 6.4. Comparison of this 
figure with Figure 6.1 indicates a large risk reduction has resulted from this change in 
unit commitment plan (note the difference in scale). 
From Table 6.5 we have the following observations. 
• Zone I's power flow infeasibility risk remains almost unchanged, zone 2's increases 
a little, but zone 3's reduces tremendously. 
• Load unbalance risk due to generation constraints reduces tremendously, voltage 
instability risk disappears altogether, voltage lower limit risk becomes almost zero. 
• The total power flow infeasibility risk reduces from $6,487,586 to $128,320, $6,359,266 
less. 
The corresponding thermal overload risk is $2,904,812, $35,159 less than the original 
Table 6.5 The composition of risk for Alternative Plan III ($) 
PFI Risk TO Risk Total Risk Decomposition Total 
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 
458 100892 26970 
128320 2904812 5855423 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
128310 0 9 
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Composite Risk curve 
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Figure 6.4 Hourly composite risk variation over a year for Alternative Plan 
III 
one. The total composite risk is $3,033,132, $6,394,425 less than the original case. 
Rerunning the unit commitment program for the alternative case we get the total fuel 
consumption is $259,832,774, $5,855,423 more than the original case. Compared with 
the risk reduction, the benefit of the unit commitment adjustment is $539,003. It means 
the generation company at bus 7 can make use of its unique position to make a profit up 
to $539,000, if there is no contract between it and the ISO, or between it and electricity 
customers to put a price cap upon it. The location monopoly prevents the power market 
from a complete free market. Some regulations such as price cap may be indispensable 
to guarantee a fair market. 
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6.6 Alternative Plan IV-Building Double Line 15-21 onto Seper-
ate Towers 
Since common mode D causes high thermal overload risk, if we build double line 
15-21 onto separate towers, we expect to reduce risk significantly. We call this plan 
Alternative Plan IV. Under this plan, the composition of risk is shown in Table 6.6, the 
hourly composite risk variation over a year is shown in Figure 6.5. 
Table 6.6 The composition of risk for Alternative Plan IV ($) 
PFI Risk TO Risk Total Risk Decomposition Total 
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 
6486924 4975 6491900 458 96381 6390085 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
6456323 4494 26107 
By adopting this plan, we reduce risk by $2,934,996 for thermal overload risk, $662 
for power flow infeasibility risk, and $2,935,657 for composite risk annually. The total 
thermal overload risk is $4,975, the total power infeasibility risk is $6,486,924, the total 
composite risk is $6,491,900. According to [11], the construction fee to build another 
line from bus 15 to bus 21 is $108,000/mile x 33 miles = $3,672,000. If the second year 
annual composite risk reduction is at least as great as that of the last year, we would 
earn back our investment within 2 years. 
6.7 Alternative Plan V-Combination of Plan III and Pljui IV 
If we both adjust unit commitment as plan III does and build double line 15-21 onto 
seperate towers as plan IV does, we get plan V. Under this plan, the composition of risk 
is shown in Table 6.7, the hourly composite risk variation over a year is shown in Figure 
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Composite Risk curve 
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Figure 6.5 Hourly composite risk variation over a year for Alternative Plan 
IV 
6.6. 
The total power flow infeasibility risk is $128,319, the total thermal overload risk is 
$251, the total composite risk is $128,570. The one time construction cost is $3,672,000. 
The cost of fuel consumption is increased by $5,855,423 compared with the original case. 
6.8 Comparison Between Plans 
Choosing the best plan from several alternative plans belongs to the theory of decision 
making. According to different criteria [76], one may choose different plans. Although 
the main goal of this dissertation is to develop the cumulative risk calculation procedure, 
it is important to point out that this procedure provides information useful in making 
planning decision. However, the subject of decision making under risk is a rich one [76] 
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Table 6.7 The composition of risk for Alternative Plan V ($) 
PFI Risk TO Risk Total Risk Decomposition Total 
Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 
128319 251 128570 
458 100891 26970 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
128309 0 9 
Composes Risk curve 
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1000 -
800 -
T(hour) 
Figure 6.6 Hourly composite risk variation over a year for Alternative Plan 
V 
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and deserves much more attention than we can give it here. To make the point, however, 
we choose a very simple decision paradigm and illustrate its use with respect to choosing 
among the alternatives studied. This decision paradigm is to select the alternative which 
has the lowest total annual cost. The cost and benefit comparison between the original 
plan and the five alternative plans are shown in Table 6.8. Here the total annual cost 
includes the composite risk, the equivalent annual investment, and the annual fuel cost. 
The equivalent annual investment comes from the allocation of one time investment 
among its life cycle. The only investment involved here is rebuilding line 15-21 along a 
different set of towers. We assume line 15-21 has 20 years of life time, and ignore the 
time value of money. Then the equivalent annual investment is the one time investment 
divided by 20. For plan V, its one time investment is $3672000. Then its equivalent 
annual investment is $3672000/20=$183600. Furthermore, we use fuel cost increment 
with respect to the original plan instead of the real fuel cost. Therefore, only plan III and 
plan V have positive fuel cost increment, other plans have zero cost increment. Based 
on this decision paradigm, we can calculate the savings compared with the original case 
by subtracting the total annual cost from that of the original case. 
From Table 6.8, we can see plan V has the largest saving. Therefore, plan V is the 
best plan according to our decision paradigm. 
Table 6.8 Comparison between different plans (all items are in dollars) 
Plan thermal infeasibi- composite annual in­ fuel cost total £in- savings 
risk lity risk risk vestment cost increment nual cost 
original 2939971 6487586 9427557 0 0 9427557 0 
plan I 2939971 6483226 9423197 0 0 9423197 4360 
plan n 2939971 6516779 9456750 0 0 9456750 -29193 
plan ni 2904812 128320 3033132 0 5855423 8888555 539002 
plan rv 4975 6486924 6491900 183600 0 6665400 2752057 
plan V 251 128319 128570 183600 5855423 6167593 3259964 
I l l  
6.9 Summary 
Cumulative power flow infeasibility risk and thermal overload risk assessment can be 
combined to get composite cumulative risk assessment. Based on the risk assessment 
results, we can design several alternative facility plans or unit commitment scenarios. 
Then cost and benefit analysis can be performed by our program. For the IEEE RTS'96, 
5 alternative plans are proposed. The most beneficial one is to make bus 7's generation 
units always on as long as they are not at maintenance, and separate the double line 
15-21 onto seperate towers. It may be possible for the generation company at bus 7 to 
take advantage of its market power, depending on its contracts. 
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CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY OF THE DISSERTATION AND 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
7.1 Summary of the Dissertation 
Under the pressure of power system restructuring, power system risk assessment 
becomes more and more important. Risk assessment has some advantages over relia­
bility evaluation in that risk assessment can easily be included into economic cost and 
benefit analysis. Because different market participants have different objectives in risk 
assessment, the assessed risk should be decomposable and assignable. 
The introduction of competitive market into the power industry has increased uncer­
tainty in operating and planning power system. One consequence of this is that utilities 
are paying more and more attention to operational planning rather than long term plan­
ning. For operational planning, the system trajectory should be considered in order to 
guarantee appropriate accuracy. Two types of models are proposed to represent system 
trajectory: the snapshot model and the sequential model. The snapshot model has al­
ready been employed by developers of some commercial packages. However, it is not 
very accurate, and it can not capture high risk time periods when load level is low and 
unit commitment is not appropriately arranged. The sequential model is a promising 
model in that it accounts for sequential unit commitment variation and its influence on 
risk assessment. The sequential Monte Carlo simulation model is accurate but too time 
consuming. Therefore, we propose a new model called the sequential mean-variance 
model. It has one expected system trajectory, together with a uniform variation at any 
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time point. 
Based on the proposed model, a cumulative risk assessment framework is built. The 
framework is highly modularized. It include.s a system trajectory identification module 
and a cumulative risk assessment module. The system trajectory identification module 
is decomposed to three submodules: load forecasting error identification submodule, 
maintenance scheduling submodule, and unit commitment submodule. The cumulative 
risk assessment module includes power flow infeasibility risk assessment submodule and 
thermal overload risk assessment submodule currently. It can be expanded to include 
steady state risk assessment submodule and transient risk assessment submodule, both 
of which belong to dynamic risk assessment. 
Various methods are investigated to develop each module required for the trajectory, 
and one method is chosen for each. The methods we chose are shown to be easy to 
implement and valid for cumulative risk assessment. However, they are not necessarily 
the best methods. Due to our modularized framework structure, these methods can be 
easily upgraded or substituted without modifying the overall program structure. 
The interior point algorithm we use in power flow infeasibility risk assessment and 
the convolution method we use in thermal overload risk cissessment are introduced. The 
potential applications of the interior point algorithm are not limited to risk assessment 
and are illustrated to some extent in this dissertation. They include maximum loadability 
calculation, ATC calculation, and applications of shadow prices. 
The IEEE RTS'96 is used as the example system throughout the dissertation to show 
the effectiveness of our framework and algorithms. This choice is for convenience and 
does not mean our framework can not be applied to other power systems. The risk 
assessment results show our assessed risk can be decomposed to answer the following 
questions: 
• When will the system suflfer severe risk? 
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• Where will the system suffer severe risk? 
• How much risk is suffered by each component? 
• How much risk is caused by each contingency? 
• What is(are) the reason(s) for a high risk? 
Furthermore, based on our risk assessment, we can propose alternative plans and 
perform cost and benefit comparison between these plans. Five alternative plans are 
proposed for the IEEE RTS'96 and compared. The most economic one is chosen. Our 
cumulative risk assessment framework is shown to be effective and useful. 
7.2 Contributions of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is part of an EPRI project (contract W08604-01). In the report of 
this project [22], we proposed the concept of risk, and we measure risk directly in dollars. 
This makes risk easy to understand and easy to include within other economic analysis. 
Furthermore in [22], we proposed frameworks for operational risk assessment and for 
cumulative risk assessment for planning. This dissertation is aimed at building the 
framework of cumulative risk assessment for planning. It has the following contributions: 
• It proposed and developed the framework of cumulative risk assessment that iden­
tifies the system trajectory and performs various kinds of risk assessment based 
on this trajectory. 
• It decomposed system trajectory identification into load forecasting error identi­
fication, maintenance scheduling, and unit commitment arrangement, and then 
proposed one feasible method for each module. 
• It proposed the idea of power flow infeasibility risk, which includes generation 
inadequacy risk, voltage instability risk and voltage exceeding the lower limit risk. 
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By using the "shadow prices" in our calculation model, different types of risk can 
be discriminated. 
' It proposed a method to calculate cumulative power flow infeasibility risk based on 
a zone-based maximum loadability subroutine. This zone-based maximum load-
ability subroutine can also be used to calculate maximum loadability, ATC (avail­
able transfer capability), and provide sensitivity information for generation limits, 
voltage limits, and tie lie flows. 
It developed a simplified direct interior point algorithm to calculate zone-based 
maximum loadability. This simplified direct interior point algorithm has only 
about one-fourth the number of equations and variables compared with the original 
interior point algorithm in each iteration. 
It explained the reason of oscillation sometimes encountered in the simplified direct 
interior point algorithm and provided various techniques to overcome it. 
It proposed a method to perform cumulative thermal overload risk assessment by 
combining the probabilistic power flow calculation with the component thermal 
overload risk assessment. Component thermal overload risk tables are built as an 
interface between probabilistic power flow calculation and the component thermal 
overload risk assessment. 
It developed a probabilistic power flow calculation method based on lineariza­
tion around the operating point and the decomposition of contributions from the 
variation of generations and the variation of loads. A new method called the 
segmentwise cluster based convolution method is developed to calculate the con­
tribution from the variation of generations. The linear transformation of Gaussian 
distributions is employed to calculate the contribution from the variation of loads. 
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• Most other approaches measure overload impact in terms of the curtailed load 
necessary to sufficiently reduce the overload, or in terms of the increased cost of 
redispatch necessary to reduce the overload, or both. However, we measure the 
overload impact in terms of the amount of sag and the damage to the conduc­
tor. This is because other researchers use deterministic thermal overload limits for 
lines, while we disregard these hard limits and use the risk in dollars as the unique 
measure for thermal overload problem. Our method eliminates heterogeneous cri­
teria applied among different lines, and shows the potential risk and benefit to 
exceed the traditional thermal overload limits without taking corrective actions. 
It is suitable for planning under restructured power market where generation com­
panies are willing to pick up more power, transmission companies are willing to 
push the thermal limits of lines and transformers, and distribution companies are 
unwilling to curtail load. Trying to avoid high thermal overload risk in the plan­
ning stage without considering corrective actions can provide clues for choosing 
alternative plans. The best plan chosen from our cost and benefit analysis can 
avoid the difficulty of corrective coordination between different companies, while 
it reduces the system thermal overload risk under an acceptable level. 
• It combined the thermal overload risk and the power flow infeasibility risk together 
to get the composite cumulative risk assessment. 
• It advocated decomposible and assignable risk assessment so that the following 
questions can be answered by our risk assessment. 
- When will the system suffer severe risk? 
- Where will the system suffer severe risk? 
- Which contingency plays the key role in causing risk? 
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- What is the main cause of risk? Thermal overload, generation limit, or voltage 
stability? 
• It performed risk assessment for one origincil plan and five alternative plans for the 
IEEE-RTS96. It applied a simple decision paradigm to compare costs and benefits 
of these plans and choose the best plan from them. It illustrated that our proposed 
risk assessment framework can be used for decision making analysis. 
7.3 Conclusions 
Power systems are undergoing structural changes due to "deregulation". This brings 
the necessity and urgency of decomposable and assignable cumulative risk assessment 
whose results are expressed directly in dollars. However, current power industry is still 
accustomed to traditional reliability evaluation, which usually provides system-wide in­
dices, only captures limited number of snapshots, is normally conservative and sometimes 
inaccurate, and is also difficult to understand and difficult to connect with economic anal­
ysis. Under this environment, we developed a systematic framework to identify system 
trajectory over a period of time and perform decomposable risk assessment based on the 
identified system trajectory. Our program based on the proposed framework can iden­
tify when the system will suffer severe risk, where the system will suffer severe risk, who 
plays the key role in causing risk, and what is the main cause of risk. It can also provide 
clues for alternative risk reduction plans, and then perform cost and benefit comparison 
between different plans. This comparison is useful for long term facility planning and 
long term contract economic analysis as well. Our program can also be combined with 
contract analysis to determine who is going to charge who for what and by how much to 
insure the fair power market. It seems there is a wide range of use for the decomposable 
cumulative risk assessment framework. 
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4 Future Research Directions 
In the future, this research can be extended along the following directions. 
• Design modules for steady state and transient risk assessment. 
• Improve methods employed in all submodules. 
• Consider transmission constraints in maintenance scheduling and unit commit­
ment. 
• Consider corrective actions and power system models in more details. 
• Design programs to calculate the variance of assessed risk. 
• Include decision making theories into cost and benefit comparison between alter­
native plans. 
• Include economic competitive market models and game theories into risk assess­
ment and decision making. 
• Consider parallel computation. 
• Consider sequential linear programming, quadratic programming or some other 
classical algorithms for maximum loadability calculation and compare their ro­
bustness and efficiency. 
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APPENDIX A IEEE RTS'96 
The data of this system is listed in [60]. 
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BUS 21 BUS 17 
230 kV BUS 13 BUS 14 
BUS IS 
BUS 24 BUS 11 BUS 12 
BUSS BUS 10 
BUS8 BUSS 
138 kV 
Figure A.l The network of IEEE RTS'96 
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APPENDIX B DETAILS FOR LOAD FORECASTING 
ERROR IDENTIFICATION 
Theory of Time Series Analysis 
Time Series Models 
There are many kinds of stochastic models. The widely used one is the autoregressive 
moving average (ARMA) model. The general expression is as follows. 
Xt  — f J ,  = <f>i {Xt - l  — f i )  +  <i>2{^ t -2  — /i) + • • • + <pp{x t -p  — f i )  +  e t  +  d l£ t - l  + • • • + 9q£ t -q  
(B.l) 
where 
• Xt is the stochastic signal at time t. 
• ^ is the expected value of Xj. For a stationary process, n remains the same at any 
time, and it can be estimated by the average of sample observations according to 
the weak law of large number. 
• 01) • • • > <^p are the AR part coefficients. 
• p is the order of the AR part. 
• is a Gaussian white noise with variance that means £t is described by 
N{0 ,  a^),  and Si ,  e j  are independent  for  al l  i  ^  j .  
•  q  i s  the order of the MA part. 
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• 01, • • • ) ^9 are the MA part coefficients. 
We define xt = Xt-fi and denote the model as ARMA(p,q). When ^i, • • • , 0, = 0, the 
model becomes an autoregressive (AR) model; when «^i, • • • , 0, = 0, the model becomes 
moving average (MA) model. 
If we use B to denote the backward shift operator, we can get 
<f>{B)x t  = e iB)e t  (B.2) 
where 
0(B) = I - <t>iB - ii)j,B^ (B.3) 
0(5) = 1 + 6 \B  + 02^^ + • • • + (B.4) 
When we choose B =  z~^ ,  we can get the z transformation form of equation 1 as 
follows. 
(P{z - ^ )X{z )  = e{ z - ' )€ { z )  (B.5) 
or 
Xiz )  =  H{z )€ i z )  (B.6) 
where H{z)  = is the transfer function, X{z )  and €( z )  a re  the transformation of 
Xt and £( respectivley. Therefore, Xt can be regarded as an output of a linear discrete 
system with transfer function H{z) driven by a white noise £t. To keep the process 
stationary, all poles of H{z) (or all zeros of (f>{z~^)) should lie inside the unit circle. 
If one pole is outside the unit circle, limt_»oo is unbounded. Such a system is to be 
avoided. 
If one pole is on the unit circle, a seasonal model, generally called the autoregressive 
integrated moving average (ARIMA) model, is often used. The general form of <I>{B) is 
^(B) = (1 - B')"!, (B.7) 
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where r, d  are positive integers. If we denote 
yt = (1 - B^Yxt (B.8) 
then Vt = Vt — My is according to ARMA model. For a strict ARIMA model, Hy = 0. 
However, /Xy can be nonzeros to include a linear evolving trend. 
This model can be denoted as ARIMA(p,d,r,q). Due to error stability consideration, 
d seldom exceeds 2. 
When d{z~^) has zeros lying in the unit circle, from Xf, £t can be observed. Such a 
property is called invertibility. However, when one zeros lies outside the unit circle, the 
system is not invertible and St can not be observed. Therefore, such a system model 
should be avoided. 
Decomposition of Model Building and Error Analysis 
Although the maximum likelihood estimations for the ARIMA model parameters are 
very good estimations theoretically, they are difficult to calculate. On the other hand, 
our algorithm should accommodate different models such as artificial neural network, 
chaos, or fuzzy logic. Therefore, we decompose the process of estimating the AR part 
parameters and the error analysis for MA part parameters. The AR part parameters 
can be easily obtained by the least square method. Suppose the time series begins from 
t = I. From the data, we have the following equations. 
Cp+l ^p+l 4^ \ ^p  '  '  '  
6^ — • • • ( f )pX f {—p 
where et is the error series. The foregoing equations can be expressed as 
x — U<t> = e (B.9) 
124 
Xp^ l  Xp  "  '  * X \  <t>i 
where x  =  
X f f  
, u  =  
XN-1  •  •  •  Xs -p  
' ^  ~ 
» 
According to the least square method [77], t le least square estimation 
0 = {u ' ^uy^uTx  (B.IO) 
Then we can get 
x  =  U<f> =  U{U' 'U) - ^U '^x  (B.ll) 
However, any other model to get x  is acceptable. Once we get i, we can calculate e. 
Then e is ready for further time series analysis. 
Time Domain Analysis: Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation co­
efficients 
The autocorrelation of a stationary stochastic process is defined as the normalized 
autocovariance. 
Tm m) 
~  70  ~  E{x j )  
(B.12) 
where Pm is the autocorrelation at time m,  7,7, is the autocovariance at time m.  
Another useful measure is the partial autocorrelation. The mth partial autocorrela­
tion (denoted ocmm) is defined as the last coefficient in a linear projection of xt on its m 
most recent values. 
^ml  
^m2  
= 
<^mm 
70 
71 
7i 
7o 
7m—1 
7m—2 
7m—1 7m—2 •••70 
71 
72 
7m 
(B.13) 
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Note that 70, • • • , 7m are all expected values. Theoretically, they should be obtained 
from an unlimited number of data. However, they can also be estimated from a limited 
sample data. 
One estimation method for jm is to use the following formulus[?7]. 
' ym  =  -m- l xN{n)xN{n  +  m)  (B.14) 
71=0 
where "ym is the estimated data of 7„„ xs in )  is the periodical expansion of x (n )  with 
period N. However, when N is extremely large, this method is slow. In such a case, we 
can use the power spectrum to estimate all 'ym at the same time. The algorithm is as 
follows [78] [79]. 
1. Add N zeros after observed Xt{t = 0,1, • • • , A'" — 1) to get X2Ar(n), then use FFT 
to get X2iv(A:), A: = 0, • • • , 2N — 1. 
2. Calcualte ^|J\:2;v(A:)p. 
3. Apply IFFT to to get 7^, m = 0,1, • • • , 2iV - 1. Only 70, • • • , 7/v_i is 
required because of the symmetry. 
ocmm can be estimated by the Levinson-Durbin recursive algorithm, which is described 
in details in [77],[78] and [79]. 
For AR(p) process, dmm are approximately independently and normally distributed 
with zero mean and variance Therefore, the probability of ocmm located within 
is approximately 95% [77]. 
For MA(q) process, we have 
Var{pm) = j^[l + 2'^p]] (B.15) 
1=1 
for m = g + 1, g + 2, • • •. 
Thus in particular, if we suspect that the data is an MA(q) process, we can check 
whether  l ies  between about  95% of the t ime when m> q.  
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Frequency Domain Analysis 
For an unlimited length signal, the power spectrum S{e^'^) and the autocovariance 
jm has the following relationship. 
00 1 r2n 
S{e>")  = (B.16) 
m=-oo ^ 
For the limited length signal, the period density spectrum 5^^(A:), is just the DFT 
of 7m-
N- l  
m=-(N-l) 
= 2^ E (B.18) 
k=-{N- l )  
For the linear system in ARIMA model described in B.7, we have 
Srie^'^) = 5,(e''")|/f(e"*')|2 = a^\H{e^^)\^ (B.19) 
Therefore, if H{z)  has a pole near then Sx(e^'^) should be extremely high at 
frequency UQ. SO 5i(e'^) is a good measure to find the seasonality of the ARIMA model. 
Furthermore, it is proved that minimizing the error in the time domain is the same 
as minimizing the error in the frequency domain [80]. 
For the ARIMA model, when d  =  I ,  y t  =  Xt  — X t - r ,  or in the frequency domain 
Y{z) = (1 - z~^)X(z). Denote F{z) = 1 - z~^, then F{z) is a transfer function of a 
filter. 
F{e^ ' ^ )  =  1  — = (1 - cos(ra;)) +jsin(ra;) = 2sin (B.20) 
when r  =  24, the magnitude-frequency curve is shown in Figure B.l. 
From Figure B.l we can see that the filter will damp u = fj, • , tt parts of signal. 
Therefore, if there are peaks at these points in the raw signal's spectrum, the filter is 
desirable to flatten the spectrum. 
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0) (in degree) 
Figure B.l The magnitude-frequency curve for F{z )  = 1 — s"*" 
In the next section, these theories will be used to identify the load forecasting error 
of the IEEE RTS'96. 
Applications to the IEEE RTS'96 
Order Determination for the load of the IEEE RTS'96 
The IEEE RTS'96 is shown in Appendix A. The hourly load during one year is shown 
in Figure B.2. The estimated spectrum is shown in Figure B.3. It has obvious frequency 
peaks once a day, once a week, and twice a day respectively. It is reasonable to apply 
differentiation by choosing r = 24 first to get rid of day cycling trend, then use AR(168) 
model for the differentiated signal to count on the week's influence. The described model 
is model ARIMA(168,1,24,1), where q is the order of the MA part to be determined. 
Let yt = Xt- Xt-24- The signal is shown in Figure B.4. The AR part coefficients for 
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Figure B.2 The hourly load during one year 
Vt = Vt — fj-y are shown in Figure B.5. According to our calculation, p,y = —2.0124 x 10"'', 
very close to 0. It means the average of the load will keep constant in the near future 
except for some oscillations. The error series after subtracting the AR part estimation 
is shown in Figure B.6. The estimated spectrum of the error series is shown in Figure 
B.7. The estimated autocorrelation coefficients (ACF) of the error series are shown 
in Figure B.8. The average ratio to exceed the bound is 4.82%, just below 5%. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume the MA part error series is a white noise. The 
partial autocorrelation coefficients (PACF) of yt are shown in Figure B.9. It cuts off 
after 168, with the ratio 1.86% to exceed the bound, well below 5%. Therefore, our 
model is correct. In our model, the estimated a is 6.86 x 10"^. 
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Figure B.3 The spectrum of the hourly load 
1500 
Load Forecasting 
Any ARIMA model can be written in the form 
— ^^ t - i  + C + Ff 
where 
^ t  =  
(B.21) 
Then 
Xt  <f>l  •  •  •  <f>p+rd—l ^p+rd  4>o £ t  
Xt—i  1  • • •  0  0  0  0  
,F  =  
: : : 
, c  =  
* * 
^t—p—rd+l  0  • • •  1  0  0  0  
^ t+s  =  F% +  { I  +  F  +  - - -  +  F ' - ' )C  + (K+, + + • • • + (B.22) 
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Figure B.4 The signal j/t's curve 
Denote fj to be the first element of the matrix F^ , then the error item 
Ce+sKf  — ^t+s + fi^t+s- i  H + /s-i^t+i (B.23) 
Therefore 
Var{xt+s\^t) = (1 + /i^ + • • • + (B.24) 
Denote <Jj = y/Var{xt+3\^t)- Then Xt+a should lie between ± 26^ with probability 
95%. The forecast load and 95% confidence interval for every hour in the next week is 
shown in Figure B.IO. From this figure we can see that the error is small during the next 
week. Therefore, our forecast is accurate. Figure B.ll shows the 6 - s curve. It seems 
that 6 increases steadily and there is no trend to stop. It means the ARIMA model is 
only appropriate for short term load forecast. For one year load forecast, the error is so 
large that the forecast values are meaningless. In fact, this property is also a common 
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Figure B.5 The AR part coefficients 
property shared by most other forecasting tools. It is just a mathematical statement of 
the common law that near future can be predicted well, but the far future can not. 
According to our calculation, the one-day ahead forecasting error 
524 = 1-92% 
We will use this error as the error in our load model. The reasons are explained 
before. 
Expansion to Multivariate Case 
In the power system, there are usually several load buses and the load in each bus 
varies diflferently. In this case, the ARIMA model expressed in B.7 can also be applied, 
except that Xt now becomes a vector, <^i, • • • ,<l>p now becomes matrices, and £t becomes 
a random vector with a mean vector and a covariance matrix. The model parameters 
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Figure B.6 The error series 
can be identified by least square method. The model can then be expressed in state 
space form, and the Karlman recursions can be applied for load forecast [77], 
In power flow feasibility risk assessment, we do not need to consider the correlation 
between loads, simply regard them varying proportionally. In thermal overload risk 
assessment however, our algorithm allows to consider the covariance matrix among loads. 
Since we do not have data, we assume the covariances among loads are as follows. 
VariPok) = 
Cov iPok^Poi) = O-dS l^PokPoi, when k , l  G fiiag, or  k ,  I  e ^230-
Cov{Pijki PDI) — 0> when k 6 fiias? I € fiaao-
Here k ,  I  are bus numbers, Pok is the load at bus k, fiiag and fiaao are bus sets for 
138 KV and 230 KV networks respectively. 
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Figure B.7 The estimated spectrum of the error series 
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Figure B.IO The forecast load and 95% confidence interval for the next week 
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APPENDIX C DETAILS FOR MAINTENANCE 
SCHEDULING 
Principles of Our Method 
Equal LOLP Method 
Suppose originally the total capacity of the system is Ct- Due to generator outages, 
in order to keep the system LOLP no more than a certain level p (e.g., p = 0.01), the 
maximum load the system can provide should be less than the total capacity Ct. We 
denote the maximum load level A. Or we can say, under the LOLP level p, the system 
available capacity is A. Now consider increasing a generator with capacity C. In order 
to keep the same LOLP level, not all the capacity C can be used to increase the available 
capacity A. Therefore C is divided into two parts. 
where CT is used to keep system risk constant, while Cej is effective capacity increment, 
called effective load carrying capacity. Carver [81] derived a formula to calculate the 
effective load carrying capacity Ce/ for a generation unit, as follows. 
where r is the forced outage rate of the generation unit, and M is the system's character­
istic slope. Consider Figure C.l. It is drawn by our software for the IEEE RTS'96. The 
horizontal axis is for the logarithm of LOLP (loss of load probability). The curve shows 
C =  Cr  +  Ce f  (C.l) 
Cef = C-M log[(l - r) + re^/^] (C.2) 
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when the reserve capacity increases, the LOLP decreases. In one year, the system load 
varies between points A and B, as shown in the figure. Although the curve is apparently 
not a line, the tangent slope will not change much within the range between A and B. 
There fo re ,  we  can  use  the  fo l lowing  fo rmula  to  ca lcu la te  M. 
Rb  — RA  M = 
log(P^ - PB )  
where R refers to reserve and P refers to probability. 
„0 0 500 
Reservation (MW) 
1000 1  ^
(C.3) 
2000 2500 
LOLP (In Logrilhm) - Reservation cun/e 
Figure C.l Log LOLP vs. Reserve Capacity curve 
Once we know A/, we can use equation C.2 to calculate the effective load carrying 
capacity for every generation unit. Arranging a unit to maintenance is equivalent to 
adding the effective load carrying capacity on the load to get equivalent load curve. To 
make the LOLP curve level is tantamont to levelizing the equivalent load curve. Here 
we use a method called "minimum cumulative energy method" [45]. The steps of this 
method are as follows. 
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1. Reorder Cef of generators from the largest to the smallest. 
2. Pick up one Cef from the list in order, look up for the required number of main­
tenance days (denoted by m). 
3. Calculate all summations of the m successive load, find the smallest one, arrange 
unit there. 
4. If this is the last unit, stop; else move to the next unit, go to 2. 
There are several ways to calculate the LOLP vs. reserve capacity curve. We have 
used the cumulant method, but other methods should be considered as well. 
Calculating LOLP by Cumulant Method 
A linear system can be expressed as F = AX +  B ,  where 
V =  
Oil ai2 
Y2  021 0-22 
1 1 Oml 0-m2 
Oln 
a2n 
Otmn 
,B  =  
k  
62 a:2 
)utions are known, If Xi, • • • ,Xn are independent random variables, and their distri 
then the distributions of Vi, • • • , can be easily obtained by Fourier transformation 
method or cumulant method. Let us introduce several concepts first. 
Characteristic function: For a random variable A" f { x ) ,  4 ) { t )  =  Ee ' ^^  — f { x )dx  
is defined as the characteristic function (often abbreviated to c.f.) of X.  
From the equation, we see that <j>{t) can be regarded as the Fourier inverse transfor­
mation of f{x). So we have 
c+00 
/
eP*^ f {x )dx  
•00 
1 
m =  ^y ^  
(C.4) 
(C.5) 
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Another concept is 
Moment: EX^  is defined as the moment of order r, r = 1,2, • • •. = E{X -  a)*" is 
defined as the moment of order r about point a. fir = E{X — EXy is defined as 
the moment of the mean, or the central moment of order r. 
EX^, n'j.andnr have the following relations. 
EX'  =  
fJ'T •• 
Mr = 
± j=0 
/ 
r  
E 
r 
j=Q 
(C.6) 
(C.7) 
(C.8) 
Therefore, if EX' is known, Mr,Mr can be obtained with ease. On the other hand, 
= EiUXye^ ' ^ ' l l t ^o  = fE{X 'e^ ' ' ' ) \ t=o  = fEX '  => drm df  t=0 
EX' = (C.9) f  d f  ^  '  
Expression C.9 means if 0(i) is known, EX'  and its corresponding Hr can be easily 
obained. Specifically the mean Hi = EX and the variance /zz = EX"^ — {EX)"^ can be 
easily obtained. 
Now consider about Yi = i = 1,2, • • • , m. It can be derived that 
n 
( t )  = = e""  J] . />x j  ( o i j t )  (C.IO) 
j=l 
Then / y .  ( y )  can be obtained by Fourier transformation. The steps of this method are 
as follows. 
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1. Use inverse Fourier transformation, calculate <j>Xj i t )  from /xj(^), j  =  I, - - ,n. 
Here IFFT algorithm can be adopted [78]. 
2. Calculate <pxj{aijt) from 
3. Use expression C.IO to calculate <t>Yi{i), i = 1, • • • , m. 
4. Use Fourier transformation to calculate /y. (y). Here FFT algorithm can be adopted. 
However, the calculation amount is still large. So the cumulant method is developed 
by some researchers to calculate risk. The concept of cumulant Kt is defined as follows. 
Cumulant: If is the characteristic function of X, then 
L{ t )  =  Log{E^ ' ^ )  =«! • • •  [ j t )  + /C2 • • • ^ + • • • + tr • ^ • (C.ll) 
where Kt  is defined as the cumulant of order r, r = 1,2, • • •. 
Kr and /Xr have the following relations. 
1x2 = K-2 
fJ-3 = «3 
/i4 = «4 + 3K2^ 
Ms = «5 + 10«3«2 
Me = «6 + I5/C4/C2 + 10«| + 15«2 
fj,7 = K7 + 2I/C5K2 + 35«4«3 + IO5/C3/C2 
fis = «8 + 28/C6«2 + 56«5K3 + 35K4 + 210/C4«:2 + 28OK3/C2 + IO5/C4 (C.12) 
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and 
/C2 = /i2 
K3 = /^3 
K4 = Hi  — 3/i2 
/C5 = /X5 - 10/^3^2 
«6 = /^6 — 15^4/^2 — IOA'S + 3O/X2 
/C7 = /i7 - 21fJ,5fi2 - 35/i4/i3 + 210/i3/i2 
«8 = /is — 28//6M2 — 56/i5/i3 — 35/^4 + 420/i4/X2 + 560/i3/i2 — 63O/X2 (C.13) 
From the definition of Kr we can easily get the following expression 
£=0 ^ jT fltr 
Therefore, we have the following formula 
I  (T"LogEe^^ ' ^ ^  1  c rL{a t )  ^  ,  . x  
"'"^1=/ —dt'—=J' ' " = ° " '  '  
I drLogEej^'^^'^^^\ \ dTLogEe^^^\ I (fLogEe^^^\ 
«r(^.+A-.) = J 1£=0 = |t=0 + J 1^=0 - «rA-. + KrA", 
(C.15) 
$2j=l  ^ i j ^ rX j  " t"  ^ i )  T  =  \  
KrYi = ' (C.16) 
T , j= ina i j K r X j ,  r > l  
Once KrYi obtained, the distribution of Yi can be approximated by Gram-Charlier 
expansion 
F ( v )  =  P ( Y  > y )  =  P ( - ^  2 :  S )  =  /  ' ^ M < ' y  +  +  f  H M  +  | i f , ( 5 )  
(C.17) 
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or by Edgeworth expansion 
F(V) = P(Y  >y )  =  >9)  =  f*"  N( , v )dy  +  JV(5 ) ( | f f 2 (y )  +  +  iMf i ,  { y )  
, 9b „ , 35^354 „ , 280gi „ , ge „ , BGgags „ , 2IOO5I5. 
+-^ff4(W + J ,  Hs[y )  +  —^H»{y )  +  g j^5(y) + g ,  ^7(y) + ——H^iy )  
15400^3^ 
•Hx i {y )  + 
12! 
where 
5 r  =  ^  =  ^ , r  =  2 , 3 , - - - .  ( C . 1 9 )  
is the normalized cumulant of the order r; 
(C.18) 
N{y)  =  - ^ e  ^ (C.20) 
v27r 
is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution. 
Hr{y) is the Hermite polynomial of order r. The first ten polynomials are 
Ho{x)  = 1 
Hi{x )  =  X 
Hzix) = - 1 
H3{X)  =  x^  —3x  
Ha{x) = — 6a:^ + 3 
H^{x )  = x^  — lOx^ + 15x 
HQ { X )  = X® — ISa;"^ + 45x^ — 15 
Hj{x )  = x^  — 21x^  + 105a;' — 105a: 
Hs{x) = X® - 28a:® + 210x^ - 420x2 + 105 
Hsix) = X® - 36x^ + 378x^ - 1260x'+ 945x 
Hio{x )  =  x^° - 45x® + 630x® - 3150x^ + 4725x2 - 945 (C.21) 
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is the normalized given value. 
The total calculation steps are as follows 
1. Calculate j = li 2, • • • i ^^7 ^ = 2,3, • • •. 
2. i  =  l .  
3. Use expression C.16 to calculate /Cry; . 
4. USe expression C.19 to calculate grVi, use expression C.22 to get a normalized yi 
for a given y,. 
5. Use expression C.17 or expression C.18 to get the probability barFyXv) = > 
Vi ) -
6. If i = m then stop; else i = i + 1, go to 3. 
However, when we use this method, we have to pay attention to the following points: 
1. The convergence of the two series expansions can only be guaranteed when /(x) has 
a derivative function that is continuous at every point, and some other conditions 
are met. This is not true in LOLP calculation, where the distribution function 
for the generation is obviously a discrete distribution functions [82]. However, 
when there are many generators, the distribution is approximate to continuous 
distribution. 
2. The method is originally used for adjustments when a distribution is near normal 
distribution. From our experience, when the number of generators is large, the 
generation's distribution is near normal distribution. So we can use this method 
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in LOLP calculation. However, this is not always true in probabilistic power flow 
convolution. 
3. We can always use pu value in Xi and Y in calculation. Appropriate choice of 
calculation base can reduce the computer's interception error. In theory, no matter 
how large you choose the beise, the magnitude of «r may be different, but the 
magnitude of gr remains the same. 
Calculation Results for the IEEE RTS'96 
The daily peak load curve of the IEEE RTS'96 is shown in Figure C.2. Every unit 
can be regarded eis a two-state component, with the probability 1 — p, to be at the 
normal state, and pi to be at the forced outage state. Therefore, the generation of one 
unit is a discrete random variable Ci, the moment items fiir of it can be calculated by 
the following formula 
fin = {l-Pi)Ci (C.23) 
fiir ~ (1 Pi){^i A'tl) i ^ — 2, 3, • • • . 
Then we can calculate /«,> and the total generation's k, by using C.13, if we assume all 
generators are independent with each other. After that, we use Gram-Charlier expansion 
to calculate the LOLP curve, as shown in Figure C.3. We can see that when the load is 
near the generation capacity, a little increment in load will cause a dramatic increment 
in LOLP. Figure C.l shows the relationship between the LOLP and the reserve capacity. 
It can be used to calculate M, as we mentioned before. For this system, M=109.3 MW. 
Table C.l shows the load carrying capacity Cef of each type of unit. We can see that 
Cef tends to be larger when the unit capacity is larger, and smaller when the forced 
outage rate is larger. 
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The real load curve Itiroughout the year 
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Figure C.2 The daily peak load curve 
The equivalent daily load curve after maintenance schedule arrangement is shown in 
Figure C.4. We can see that it is much smoother than Figure C.2. It proves that our 
technique to levelize the system LOLP is effective. 
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Figure C.3 The LOLP vs. Load curve 
Table C.l The effective load carrying capacities of different unit types 
Unit type Description Capacity (MW) FOR Ce/(MW) 
1 Fossil Steam 12 0.02 11.75 
2 Combustion Turbine 20 0.10 17.83 
3 Fossil Steam 76 0.02 73.83 
4 Fossil Steam 100 0.04 93.65 
5 Fossil Steam 155 0.04 142.11 
6 Fossil Steam 197 0.05 172.33 
7 Fossil Steam 350 0.08 234.11 
8 Nuclear 400 0.12 212.82 
9 Hydro 50 0.01 49.37 
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The equivalent load curve throughout the year 
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Figure C.4 The daily equivalent load curve after maintenance arrangement 
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APPENDIX D DETAILS FOR UNIT COMMITMENT 
ARRANGEMENT 
Problem Discription in Mathematical Form 
The unit commitment problem can be described as the following mathematical op­
timization problem. 
1=1 «=1 
subject to 
ni "h nn 
t=i t=i 1=1 
Q.25N nh 
E E P L - ' E ,  
t=l i=l 
Q.5N tih 
E 
t=0.25A^+l i=l 
0.75Af n/i 
t=0.5iV+l i=l 
N Tlh 
53 f^PL = E, 
t=0.75N+l 1=1 
PL<Chs, t = 0.25(s - l)iV + 1, • • • ,0.25siV, s = l,--- ,4. 
and a minimum gap constraint, which can be described as follows: 
if there exist ti,t2 such that t//' = C//' = 3 and for all i < t2, C// 3, then if 
T2—TX< MIN-GAPI,  UF = 2 IOT all  such t ,  i  = 1,  • •  •  ,  UT. 
(D.l) 
(D.2) 
(D.3) 
(D.4) 
(D.5) 
(D.6) 
(D.7) 
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In this model, the symbols are explained as follows. 
• Pj' is the generation of thermal unit i at time t. 
• Ul is the unit state of thermal unit i at time t. There are four states: 
0 denotes the unit is in maintanance. 
1 denotes the unit is in cold reserve. 
2 denotes the unit is in hot reserve. 
3 denotes the unit is in operation. 
• denotes the generation of hydro unit i at time t. 
• denotes the generation of nuclear unit i at time t. 
• Pq denotes the total load at time t. However, it is a load used for calculation pur­
poses. We choose it to be the actual load multiply 1.06 in order to accommondate 
transmission loss. 
• S\ denotes the start up cost of unit i at time t. 
• F(-,-) is the operational cost for thermal unit i at time t, it is a function of Pj' 
a n d  U F .  
are the numbers of thermal units, hydro units and nuclear units at time 
t that is not in maintanance respectively. 
N is the number of hours for one calculation year. Here only 52 weeks of data are 
available, therefore N = 8736. 
El, E2, E3, E4 are total availabe hydro energy of spring, summer, autumn and 
winter respectively. 
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• C/ij is the available capacity of season s, s = 1 means spring, s = 2 means summer, 
s = 3 means autumn, s = 4 means winter. 
• min-gapi is the minimum duration for unit i in cold reserve between two non-
consecutive operation states. It is the sumation of minimum down time and the 
minimum up time. 
The first constraint reveals the power balance. The second through fifth represent 
hydro power energy constraints. The sixth expresses hydro unit capacity constraint. 
The last constraint reveals minimum cold reserve hours between two nonconsecutive 
operation states. If a gap is shorter than the minimum gap, we should keep the unit 
in hot reserve. However, the minimum shut down time and start up time between an 
operation state and a hot reserve state are ignored, and the generation variations during 
the transition process are also ignored in order to simplify our calculation. Furthermore, 
we assume there is no cost for using hydro power, and nuclear units are always in full 
capacity as long as they are not in maintenance. These assumptions are reasonable as 
hydro power is always very cheap compared with thermal units, and most companies 
are reluctant to adjust nuclear units. 
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Review of Lagrange Relaxation Method 
The Lagrange relaxation method constructs the Lagrange function first. The La­
grange function for our problem can be expressed as follows. 
+ - EZ, n - E2. K - E£. 
~ S(=0.25ts-l)W+I ^Ai) 
= i:Z,EL(F(Pi,v!) + s!-x'Pi) 
, yine xt/pt V"*'> Pt V^nn pf \ 
^ 2^«=1 Z-ft=l \^D ~ 2^i=l ^hi ~ 2^1=1 ^ni) 
+ 5Za=l — I^t=0.25(j-l)JV+l ^Ai) 
We desire to minimize the Lagrange function under the constraints. When the power 
balance constraints and the hydro energy constraints are met, the added items in the 
Lagrange function will not take effect. If we always choose A' and fi' such that 
nt Tin 
A'(Pi--t^PL) >0 
t=l 1=1 i=l 
Q.2bsN 
f'iE,- Y. (D-8) 
<=0.25(3-l)Ar+l 
the added items become penalty items. Therefore, minimizing L with respect to P/j, 
Ul^iPli first while fixing A', then maximizing L with respect to A', while fixing 
P/i, will drive us to the optimized solution. This is the basic idea of Lagrange 
relaxation method. We can also explain the method in an economic way. Suppose at 
every hour there is a power market. A' is the power energy marginal price. If A' is low, 
sellers are unwilling to produce power, the generation of commited units is not enough 
to compensate load, then we should raise the price A'. On the other hand, if A' is high, 
sellers are willing to produce power, the generation of commited units is more than load, 
then we should reduce the price. The same principle is also applied to hydro energy 
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constraints, is just the price of hydro power in season s. A buyer will buy as much 
hydro power as possible whenever the hydro power price is cheaper them the thermal 
power price A'; and will not buy any hydro power whenever > A'; when the two prices 
are equal, any possible division between thermal power and hydro power is acceptable. 
Therefore, when /x® is small, hydro energy will be used up too quickly, then we should 
increase when is large, extra water will be left, then we should decrease The 
point that we coincidentally use up all water just after we arrange the last hour's unit 
commitment corresponds to the solution. Once we set all the prices, every unit can use 
them to determine unit commitment to minimize cost by dynamic programming, and 
the buyer can also determine how much hydro power can be purchased. The thermal 
unit commitment calculation can be fulfilled independently for each unit by dynamic 
programming. This kind of decomposition is also shown in the second expression in 
equation (8). Once the individual optimization results meet all constraints, we get the 
global optimization solution. 
In reality, we are not always lucky to get a converged solution. Because unit commit­
ment is a typical nonlinear and discontinuous problem, there is normally no guarantee 
for convergence. In order to understand this, we can define the primal and dual problems 
as follows. 
Primal problem When we fix the unit commitment pattern and search for the eco­
nomic dispatch solution, we are solving the primal problem by minimizing La­
grange function. The minimization result can be denoted by J. When the gener­
ation capacity is not enough to provide load, we apply a large penalty. 
Dual problem When we fix A' and and search for unit commitment pattern decom-
posedly by dynamic programming, we get the value of the dual problem. It can 
be denoted by q. 
From the definition the primal solution J is always greater than the dual solution 
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q. We can define the duality gap as As we mentioned, there is no guarantee for 
the duality gap to be converged to zero. As long as the duality gap is small enough, we 
should stop and make final adjustments to make the solution feasible. 
There are several points we should specify. 
• We can start from a primal feasible solution, or a dual feasible solution. The 
case that all prices are zeros is a convenient dual feasible solution. The case that 
economic dispatch assuming all units are on is calculated for each hour, with zero 
output units canceled from the unit commitment is a convenient primal feasible 
solution. We think that starting from primal feasible solution is better, because 
at least we have a feasible solution. 
• Dynamic programming is very time consuming when one year is considered. How­
ever, Lagrange relaxation method has to carry on a lot of dynamic programming 
calculations. Therefore, it is unrealistic to use Lagrange relaxation method to 
calculate unit commitment for one year. 
• There is no guarantee that when the dual solution is stopped, it will be a feasible 
solution. Further adjustment may lose optimization. Therefore, even if we use 
Lagrange relaxation method, we can not guarantee to get the best solution. 
• The best solution, although an economic one, may be a stressed case when the 
transmission system is considered. If we account for security risk, it may not be 
the best. 
• When the number of generators increases, we have more choices to maneuver, 
therefore, the duality gap can be smaller. When the time length increases, we 
have to meet more constraints, and the duality gap tends to be larger. 
Above all, the Lagrange relaxation method is not an appropriate method for one year 
unit commitment calculation because it is too time consuming. However, some basic 
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ideas such as marginal price £ind duality gap can be borrowed to calculate and check our 
priority list method. 
Piecewise Linear Model for a Thermal Unit 
For a thermal unit, fuel consumption cost curve is normally represented by a quadratic 
or a cubic curve. It is accurate but not convenient. Especially under the deregulated 
power market, it is inconvenient for a generation agent to tell a customer " my electricity 
price is a quadratic curve with coefficients a,b,c", instead, he will say "my electricity 
price is $30 per MWh if you buy 5 MW or less, and $40 per MWh if you buy 5 to 10 
MW". Therefore, the piecewise linear model is more suitable. We will show that the 
piecewise linear model is also more convenient for calculation. 
Consider Figure D.l. First we ignore the start up cost, and only consider about 
the operation cost. When we calculate economic dispatch, we always have a system 
incremental cost, which is the current price for the load increment. If a unit has marginal 
cost below this incremental cost, the unit should increase its power; otherwise, if a unit 
has marginal cost beyond the incremental cost, the unit should decrease its power. Now 
consider the incremental cost as it increases from 0 to +oo. We denote the system 
incremental cost A'. When A' < AB's price, the optimal output for the unit is 0. When 
A'=AB's price, the optimal output can be any number between 0 and PB- When AB's 
price< A' <BC's price, the optimal output should be kept at PB- When A'= BC's price, 
the optimal output can be any value between PB and Fc, and so on. Therefore, if we 
only choose A' to be among prices of all piecewise linear segments, we can still obtain 
all possible output power. If we have 4 linear segments for each unit and 24 units in 
operation, we only have to investigate 96 possible A' values. Compared with the infinite 
number of possible A' values when smooth curves are employed, the piecewise linear 
model has great advantage, and it can also give an optimal range instead of just one 
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point. This is very important in hydro-thermal coordination. It makes the calculation 
more robust to the accuracy of various shadow prices. 
Now consider whether we should turn a unit on or off. We still ignore startup cost. 
We know A' is the market price at time t, and we tune it to optimize unit commitment. 
From equation D.l if for a unit F{Pli, Uf) — < 0, the unit should be on at time t, 
otherwise it should be off. Now consider A' increases from 0 to +oo in Figure D.l. When 
A' < slope of OD, the unit should be off. When slope of 0D< A' <slope of DE, the unit 
should be operated at state D. When A' =slope of DE, the unit can be operated at any 
point between D and E. When A' >slope of DE, the unit should be operated at state 
E. There is also another case, as shown in Figure D.2. In Figure D.2, when A' <slope 
of OE, the unit should be off; when A' >slope of OE, the unit should be operated at 
point E. Above all, the possible unit states are very limited and discontinuous in unit 
commitment calculation, as opposed to the volatility and continuity in economic dispatch 
calculation. This leads to the problem that the duality gap can not be eliminated in 
principle. When we ignore start up cost, we can also discretize A"s values. For Figure 
D.l's case, we can add the slope of DE to the price list; for Figure D.2's case, we can 
add the slope of OE to the price list. If we include the critical prices for all units and 
order them in sequence, we can choose A' only from this set. However, when startup 
cost is considered, we have to deal with dynamic programming, then the choice of A' 
should not be limited to such a price set. This is also a drawback of accurate Lagrange 
relaxation method. 
In our program, we combine the economic dispatch incremental cost set and A' set 
together, calculate minF(Pt,, C/,) — APj, for each A in the set and each unit, and the 
optimal generation range Pimax]- Then we record all these data in a table (We call 
it Fee Record Table). Since the same type of units have the same min F(Pti, Ui) - XPu 
and [i^mifn/^max] values, we only have to assign one record line for each unit type 
instead of each unit. When we choose or adjust A, we even do not have to know the 
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Figure D.l The fuel consumption curve of a thermal unit-case I 
real value of A, as long as we know its index in the list. Then we can use the table to 
know if the generator should be on or ojfF, what is the economic generation range if the 
system incremental cost is given. This technique saves a large amount of calculation 
time. However, the accurate Lagrange relaxation method will inevitably lose such an 
advantage. 
Our Heuristic Method 
The steps of our heuristic method is shown in pseudo code as follows. 
1. Form the A list and the Fee Record Table. 
2. For s=l:4 
(1) pick up one n' from the A list. 
(2) for t = (s — l)N/4 + 1 : sN/4 
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Figure D.2 The fuel consumption curve of a thermal unit-case II 
a. pick up one A' from the A list. 
b. sum the total generation range including the hydro power. 
c. if the range cover the load, record the hydro power range, go to the next t; 
else change A', go to b. 
(3) if the hydro energy range cover the given energy Es, our unit commitment for 
season s is ok, otherwise adjust the hydro power price /x®, go to (2). 
3. Check for the minimum gap constraint, change unit state from 1 (cold reserve) to 2 
(hot reserve) whenever there is a violation. 
4. For the obtained unit commitment pattern, apply economic dispatch. Hot reserve 
units also participate in economic dispatch. 
5. If a thermal unit has power output, set it to be at state 3; if it has 0 output but it is 
at state 3, set it at 2. 
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6. If there are more consecutive 2s than minimum gap, set them to 1 (cold reserve). 
This is because in the IEEE RTS'96 system, when the duration is longer than minimum 
gap, stay in state 1 (cold reserve) is always more economic than stay in state 2 (hot 
reserve). 
7. Arrange the power proportionally among generators. 
8. Check for Pgmin constraints and make appropriate adjustments. 
Steps 7 and 8 need to be explained in details. Just before step 7 is run, our program 
can guarantee the following two things. 
• In every hour t, < Ph < Pgmax, where and P^^^^ are the total mini­
mum optimal generation and total maximum generation respectively. 
• In every season s, ^hmin <E,< where and ^hmax minimum 
hydro energy and total maximum hydro energy of season s respectively. 
We want to arrange power among units proportionally. That is to say: 
1. If for time t, the minimum economic hydro power output is for one hydro 
unit, and the maximum is P^^ax^ actual hydro power output for the unit 
can be chosen as 
H = PLin + IhiPLax - PLin) (D-9) 
where 
7^ = {E, - - E^^J (D.IO) 
Such a choice can guarantee us to use up all hydro energy, and every operational 
hydro unit outputs the same power since they are of the same type. 
2. After subtracting the hydro power both from P^in, Pgmax Phi new 
values should satisfy < PD ^ Pgmax- Therefore, if we choose 
y = (P'n - - -Cin) (D.ll) 
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we can arrange every unit which is in operation to output power 
Such a choice can guarantee us to meet the load demand precisely, and the same 
type units output the same power if they are in operation. 
Step 8 is used when the minimum unit output constraints are taken into account. 
These constraints are not listed in our previous mathematical model. However, if we 
choose 5% to be the minimum thermal unit output ratio, which is reasonable, we find 
that we have several violations in our solution. This can be adjusted in the following 
way. If the output of a thermal unit is less than 5%, we sum the output of all units 
with the same type together, if the output is more than 5% of one unit's capacity, we 
just concentrate those power on one unit and transfer the other units to state 2 or 1 
according to minimum gap constraint; if the output is less than 5%, we ignore the power 
and transfer all such units to state 2 or 1 according to minimum gap constraint. Such 
an adjustment may lead to guaranteed transmission loss ratio less than 6%, but this is 
not a serious problem. 
Duality Gap Calculation 
After these adjustments, we can calculate the total fuel cost including start up cost 
of the whole system for one year. If we use $3.0/MBtu, $1.5/MBtu, and $0.65/MBtu as 
the price of oil, coal and nuclear fuel, which are typical, then we obtain the system total 
fuel cost for one year is $ 2.54 x 10®. Now we want to know how good it is. We know this 
is just the value of the primal problem J. If we fix the current A' and use the dynamic 
programming to optimize unit commitment, we are calculating the dual problem's value 
q. If there is no unit commitment changed, then we have already found the optimal 
solution. Unfortunately this is not the case for this system. We found q = 1.78 x 10®, 
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and the duality gap {J - q)/q is 0.43. As far as one year long is considered, the duality 
gap is quite small. And it can be easy to check that the dual solution is not a feasible 
solution, some constraints are violated. Therefore q is the lower bound of the optimal 
solution, it is the ideal goal that we can never attain. The optimal solution should be 
between $ 2.54 ~ 1.78 x 10®. If someone is not satisfied with our heuristic result of 7, 
our result is at least a good start for further calculation by Lagrange relaxation method. 
In duality calculation, the most difficult and time consuming part is the dynamic 
programming calculation. How to take the minimum gap constraint into consideration 
is the key to design the dynamic programming. Here we use a technique we called "state 
expansion" technique. In our technique, a thermal unit has more than 3 possible states 
when it is not in maintanance, state 1 is expanded to only 1 consecutive state that 
is 1, two consecutive states that are Is, - • •, g consecutive states that are Is, where g 
denotes the minimum gap. Therefore, in our calculation a unit may have as many as 
g + 2 possbile states at a time. At time t, for every possible state, we can find the most 
economic path, therefore, we only have to record g + 2 optimal paths and update them 
hour by hour till we meet the end of the year. However, when the maintanance is met, 
we change all the paths to the most optimal path, and begin new dynamic programming 
after the maintanance is done. 
Our software is written in matlab and runs on HP 166MHz station. It spends about 
half an hour to calculate unit commitment, while it spends 4 to 5 hours to calculate 
duality gap. This is one reason why we no longer use the Lagrange relaxation method. 
Power Flow Calculations and Final adjustments 
After determining the unit commitment, we find bus 23 always has units in operation 
and the generation capacity is always large. Therefore, it is convenient for us to choose it 
to be the swing bus. We then carry out power flow calculation for each hour. All power 
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flows are converged and only line 7-8 sometimes exceeds the continuous thermal overload 
rate. When the 3 units connected with bus 7 are on, we reduce the power output of the 
3 units to mitigate the thermal overload of line 7-8. The power flow calculations still 
converge, and the thermal overload cases are confined to 6 hours, all are the thermal 
overload of line 7-8. The most severe case has the equivalent S = y/P^ + = 176.6 
MVA, exceeds the continuous rate 175 MVA. Here P and Q are in Unit MVA, V is 
line voltage's per unit value. All these cases occur when there is no unit at bus 7 in 
operation. On the other hand, such a minor violation is tolerable especially for a short 
time. Therefore, we have already arranged system states at every hour for one year. 
Further risk analysis can proceed based on our calculation result. 
164 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
[1] IEEE PICA 97 Tutorial Committee, Open Access Impact on Energy Scheduling 
Pricing and Control, Columbus, Ohio: IEEE Power Industry Computer Applica­
tions, 1997. 
[2] Richard P. O'Neill and Ben Hobbs and David Mead and Michael Rothkopf, 
"Short-term electric auction markets: ISOs, information, the inconvenience of non-
convexity, and inappropriate behavior", Proceedings of Bulk Power System Dynam­
ics and Control IV-Restructuring, pp. 3-28, Santomi, Greece, August 1998. 
[3] Gerald B. Sheble, "Alternative implementations of auction mechanisms", Pro­
ceedings of Bulk Power System Dynamics and Control IV-Restructuring, pp. 69-80, 
Santorni, Greece, August 1998. 
[4] Junji Kubokawa, Hiroshi Sasaki, Kenji Okada, Hiroshi Asano, Ryuichi Yokoyama, 
"Evaluation of Reserve Supply Cost in the Japanese Electricity Market", Proceed­
ings of Bulk Power System Dynamic and Control IV-Restructuring, pp. 341-350, 
Santorni, Greece, August 1998. 
[5] Jung-Uk Lim, Kwang Y. Lee, Young-Moon Park, Hee-Seog Koh, "An analytic 
approach to cost allocation for multiple wheeling transactions", Proceedings of 
Bulk Power System Dynamic and Control IV-Restructuring, pp. 719-724, Santorni, 
Greece, August 1998. 
165 
[6] Paul Haase, "Charting power system security", EPRI journal, pp. 27-31, Septem­
ber/October 1998. 
[7] E. Henley and H. Kumamoto, Probabilistic Risk Assessment, New York: IEEE 
Press, 1991. 
[8] J. Grandell, Aspects of Risk Theory, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1991. 
[9] Emmett J. Vaughan, Risk Management, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997. 
[10] IEEE, The New IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronic Terms, 5th 
edition, Piscataway: IEEE Press, 1993. 
[11] Agustin A. Irizarry-Rivera, Risk Management for Dynamic Security Constrained 
Electric Power Systems, Ph.D. dissertation, Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University, 
1997. 
[12] Roy Billinton, Reliability Evaluation of Power Systems, London: Plenum Press, 
1996. 
[13] CIGRE Task Force 38.03.12, Power System Security Assessment: A Position Paper, 
Paris: CIGRE, 1997. 
[14] CIGRE Study Committee 38, Power System Reliability Analysis Application Guide, 
Paris: CIGRE, 1987. 
[15] T. Dy Liacco, "The adaptive reliability control system", IEEE Transactions on 
Power Apparatus and Systems, vol. PAS-86, pp. 517-531, May 1967. 
[16] T. Dy Liacco, "Real-time computer control of power systems". Proceedings of 
IEEE, vol. 62, pp. 874-891, July 1974. 
[17] T. Dy Liacco, "System security: the computer's role", IEEE Spectrum, vol. 15, pp. 
43-50, May 1967. 
166 
[18] North American Electric Reliability Council, NERC Planning Standards, Princeton, 
New Jersey: NERC, September 1997. 
[19] B. Porretta, D. L. Kiguel, G. A. Hamoud, E. G. Neudorf, "A comprehensive ap­
proach for adequacy and security evaluation of bulk power systems", IEEE Trans­
action on Power Systems, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 433-441, August 1991. 
[20] TRELSS User Group (TUG) Meeting & Training Workshop, Transmission Relia­
bility Evaluation, EPRI Report, September 1998. 
[21] CIGRE Task Force 13 of Advisory Group 38.03, "Sequential probabilistic methods 
for power system operation and planning", CIGRE Proceedings, Paris, pp. 69-99, 
August 1998. 
[22] James D. McCalley and Vijay Vittal, Risk Based Security Assessment, EPRI Final 
Report, Project W08604-01, 1998. 
[23] G.E.P. Box, G.M. Jenkins, D. W. Bacon, "Models for Forecasting Seasonal and 
Nonseasonal Time Series", in Spectral Analysis of Time Series, pp. 146-151, New 
York: Wiley, 1967. 
[24] G.E.P. Box and G. M. Jenkins, "Some Recent Advances in Forecasting and Con­
trol", Applied Statistic Society, vol. B24, pp. 1321-1328, 1968. 
[25] G.E.P. Box and G. M. Jenkins, Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control, 
revised ed., London: Holden-Day, 1976. 
[26] G.E.P. Box, G. M. Jenkins, G.C. Reinsel, Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and 
Control, 3rd ed., Englewood Cliflfs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994. 
[27] J.W. Cooley and J.W. Tukey, "An algorithm for the machine ceilculation of complex 
fourier series", Math. Computation, vol. 19, pp. 297-301, 1965. 
167 
[28] R. E. Kalman, "New methods and results in linear filtering and prediction theory", 
ASME J. Basic Engineering, vol. 83, pp. 35-45, 1960. 
[29] Timothy Masters, Neural, Novel & Hybrid Algorithms for Time Series Prediction, 
New York: John Wiley &: Sons Inc., 1995. 
[30] D. Brillinger, New Directions in Time Series Analysis, Berlin: Springer Verlag, 
1992. 
[31] A. Piras, A. Germond, B. Buchenel, K. Imhof, Y. Jaccard, "Heterogeneous artificial 
neural network for short term electrical load forecasting", IEEE Trans, on Power 
Systems, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 397-402, February 1996. 
[32] 0. Mohammed, D. Park, R. Merchant, T. Dinh, C. Tong, A. Azeem, J. Farah, 
C. Drake, "Practical experiences with an adaptive neural network short-term load 
forecasting system", IEEE Trans, on Power Systems, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 254-265, 
February 1995. 
[33] Alireza Khotanzad, Rey-Chue Hwang, Alireza Abaye, "An Adaptive modular ar­
tificial neural network hourly load forecaster and its implementation at electric 
utilities", IEEE Trans, on Power Systems, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 1716-1722, August 
1995. 
[34] Alex D. Papalexopoulos, Shangyou Hao, Tie-Mao Peng, "Implementation of a 
neural network based load forecasting model for the EMS", IEEE Trans, on Power 
Systems, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 1956-1962, November 1994. 
[35] T. S. Dillon, "Short term load forecasting using an adaptive neural network", 
Electrical Power & Energy Systems, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 186-192, August 1996. 
168 
[36] Shin-Tzo Chen, David C. Yu, Alireza R. Moghaddamjo, "Weather sensitive short 
term load forecasting using nonfully connected artificial neural network", IEEE 
Trans, on Power Systems, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 1098-1105, August 1992. 
[37] Hiroyuki Mori, Hidenori Kobayashi, "Optimal fuzzy inference for short-term load 
forecasting", IEEE Trans, on Power Systems, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 390-396, February 
1996. 
[38] Hiroyuki Mori, Shouichi Urano, "Short-term load forecasting with chaos time se­
ries analysis", Proceedings of the International Conference on Intelligent Systems 
Applications to Power Systems, pp. 133-137, Janurary 1996. 
[39] A.G. Bakirtzis, J. B. Theocharis, S. J. Kiartzis, K. J. Satsios, "Short term load 
forecasting using fuzzy neural networks", IEEE Trans, on Power Systems, vol. 10, 
no. 3, pp. 1518-1524, August 1995. 
[40] Kwang-Ho Kim, Jong-Keun Park, Kab-Ju Hwang, Sung-Hak Kim, "Implementa­
tion of hybrid short-term load forecasting system using artificial neural networks 
and fuzzy expert systems", IEEE Trans, on Power Systems, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 
1534-1539, August 1995. 
[41] Dipti Srinivasan, "Demand forecasting using fuzzy neural computation, with special 
emphasis on week end and public holiday forecasting", IEEE Trans, on Power 
Systems, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 1897-1903, November 1995. 
[42] D. Srinivasan, "Forecasting daily load curves using a hybrid fuzzy-neural approach", 
lEE Proceedings on Generation, Transmission and Distribution, vol. 141, no. 6, pp. 
561-567, November 1994. 
[43] E. L. Silva, M. Morozowski, L. G. S. Fonseca, G. C. Oliveira, A. C. G. Melo, J. C. 
O. Mello, "Transmission constrained maintenance scheduling of generating units: 
169 
a stochastic programming approach", IEEE Trans, on Power Systems, vol. 10, no. 
2, pp. 695-701, May 1995. 
[44] M. K. C. Marwali, and S. M. Shahidehpour, "Deterministic approach to genera­
tion and transmission maintenance scheduling with network constraints", Electrical 
Power Systems Research, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 101-113, October 1998. 
[45] X. Wang and J. R. McDonald, Modem Power System Planning, London: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1994. 
[46] R. Yokoyama and T. Niimura, "Thermal generating unit maintenance scheduling 
by multi-stage application of simulated annealing", Proceedings of the IEEE Inter­
national Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, pt. 2, vol. 2, pp. 1531-1535, 
October 1996. 
[47] Hiroshi Sasaki, Yoshiyuki Takiuchi, Junji Kukobawa, "Application of artificial net­
works to maintenance scheduling covering of thermal units over several consecutive 
years", Electrical Engineering in Japan, vol. 116, no. 4, pp. 64-74, April 1996. 
[48] Amril Aman, Anantram Balakrishnan, Vijay Chandru, "On-line maintenance of op­
timal machine schedules", Sadhana-Academy Proceedings in Engineering Sciences, 
vol. 22, pt. 2, pp. 257-279, April 1997. 
[49] Kenneth L. Kiper, "Risk informed on-line maintenance at Seabrook Station", In­
ternational Conference on Nuclear Engineering, pp. 240-241, May 1997. 
[50] Allen J. Wood and Bruce F. Wollenberg, Power Generation Operation, and Control, 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996. 
[51] Sridhar Kondragunta, Genetic Algorithm Unit Commitment Program, M.S. Thesis, 
Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University, 1997. 
170 
[52] Fred N. Lee, "The application of commitment utilization factor to thermal unit 
commitment", IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 691-698, 
May 1991. 
[53] Thomas J. Overbye, "Power flow measure for unsolvable cases", IEEE Transactions 
on Power Systems, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 1359-1365, August 1993. 
[54] Roy Billinton and Saleh Aboreshaid, "Voltage stability considerations in composite 
power system reliability evaluation", IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 
13, no. 2, pp. 655-660, May 1998. 
[55] A.C.G. Melo, J.C.O. Mello, S. Granville, "The effects of voltage collapse problems 
in the reliability evaluation of composite systems", IEEE Transactions on Power 
Systems, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 480-488, February 1997. 
[56] S. Granville, J. C. o. Mello, A. C. G. Melo, "Application of interior point methods 
to power flow unsolvability", IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 11, no. 2, 
pp. 1096-1103, May 1996. 
[57] X. Wang, G. C. Ejebe, J. Tong, J. G. Waight, "Preventive/Corrective control for 
voltage stability using direct interior point method", IEEE Transactions on Power 
Systems, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 878-883, August 1998. 
[58] P. Kessel and H. Clavitsch, "Estimating the voltage stability of a power system", 
IEEE Transaction on Power Delivery, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 550-557, July 1986. 
[59] Powertech Labs, Inc., Release Notes for VSTAB Version 4-1 Survey, British 
Columbia, Canada: Powertech Inc. Press, January 1996. 
[60] The Reliability Test System Task Force of the Application of Probability Methods 
Subcommittee, "The IEEE Reliability Test System-1996", IEEE PWRS WM, pp. 
326-334, 1996. 
171 
[61] Youjie Dai, James D. McCalley, Vijay Vittal, "Expansion and Enhancement of 
Direct Interior Point Algorithm on Power System Maximum Loadability", IEEE 
Power Industry Computer Applications 99, pp. 234-241, April 1999. 
[62] G.A.N. Mbamalu, M.E. El-Hawary, Ferial El-Hawary, "A comparison of probabilis­
tic power flow with deterministic based solutions", Electric Machines and Power 
Systems, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 511-520, 1996. 
[63] B. Borkowska, "Probabilistic load flow", IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus 
and Systems, vol. PAS-93, no. 3, pp. 752-759, 1974. 
[64] O. A. Klitin, "Stochastic load flows", IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and 
Systems, vol. PAS-94, no. 2, pp. 299-309, March/April 1975. 
[65] R. N. Allan, A. M. Leite da Silva, A. A. Abu-Nasser, R. C. Burchett, "Discrete 
convolution in power system reliability", IEEE Transactions on Reliability, vol. 
R-30, no. 5, pp. 452-456, December 1981. 
[66] R. N. Allan, "Probabilistic load flow using multilinearisations", lEE Proceedings, 
vol. 128, pt. c, no. 5, pp. 280-287, September 1981. 
[67] A. M. Leite da Silva, V. L. Arienti, R. N. Allan, "Probabilistic load flow considering 
dependence between input nodal powers", IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus 
and Systems, vol. PAS-103, no. 6, pp. 1524-1530, June 1984. 
[68] H. R. Sirisena and E. P. M. Brown, "Representation of non-Gaussian probabil­
ity distributions in stochastic load-flow studies by the method of Gaussian sum 
approximations", lEE Proceedings, vol. 130, pt. C, no. 4, pp. 165-171, July 1983. 
[69] Marian Sobierajski, "Optimal stochastic load flows". Electrical Power Systems 
Research, no. 2, pp. 71-75, 1979. 
172 
[70] Roy Billinton and Wenyuan Li, Reliability Assessment of Electric Power Systems 
Using Monte Carlo Methods, London: Plenum Press, 1994. 
[71] B.C. Lesieutre and J. Hockenberry, "Uncertainty analysis of power system simula­
tions and ATC calcualtions using the probabilistic collocation method", Proceedings 
of Bulk Power System Dynamics and Control IV-Restmcturing, pp. 573-584, San-
torini, Greece, August 1998. 
[72] A. M. Leite da Silva, S. M. P. Ribeiro, V. L. Arienti, R. N. Allan, M. B. F. Do 
Coutto, "Probabilistic load flow techniques applied to power system expansion 
planning", IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 1047-1053, 
November 1990. 
[73] Youjie Dai, James D. McCalley, Vijay Vittal, "Annual Risk assessment for system 
thermal overload", Proceedings of American Power Conference, pp. 88-93, Chicago, 
April 1998. 
[74] Hua Wan, James D. McCalley, Vijay Vittal, "Increasing Thermal Rating by Risk 
Analysis", IEEE PES Winter Meeting, pp. 128-135, February 1998. 
[75] Weihui Fu, James D. McCalley, Vijay Vittal, "Risk-based assessment of transformer 
thermal loading capability", Proceedings of North American Power Symposium, pp. 
118-123, October 1998. 
[76] James R. Buck, Economic Risk Decisions in Engineering and Management, Ames, 
Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1989. 
[77] Peter J. Brockwell and Richard A. Davis, Introduction to Time Series and Fore­
casting, Berlin: Springer, 1996. 
[78] Kongde Zhong, Digital Signal Processing, Beijing: Tsing Hua University Press, 
1988 (in Chinese). 
173 
[79] John G. Proakis and Dimitris G. Manolakis, Digital Signal Processing Principles, 
Algorithms, and Applications, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
1996. 
[80] James D. Hamilton, Time Series Analysis, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1994. 
[81] L. L. Garver, "Effective load carrying capability of generating units", IEEE Trans­
action on Power Apparatus and Systems, pp. 476-483, August 1966. 
[82] Ihsan Karabulut, Edgeworth Expansion and Bootstrap Approximation for the Distri­
bution of M-estimators of A Simple Linear Regression Parameter without Cramer's 
Condition, Master Thesis, Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1991. 
[83] R. N., Allan and M. R. G. Al-Shakarchi, "Probabilistic Techniques in a.c. Load 
Flow Analysis", Proceedings of lEE, vol. 124, pt. c, no. 6, pp. 531-536, 1976. 
[84] Youjie Dai, James D. McCalley, Vijay Vittal", "Stochastic load model identification 
and its possible applications". Proceedings of North American Power Symposium, 
pp. 244-251, October 1997. 
[85] Youjie Dai, James D. McCalley, Vijay Vittal, "A heurisitc method to arrange unit 
commitment for one year considering hydro-thermal coordination", Proceedings of 
North American Power Symposium, pp. 382-387, October 1998. 
